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The nation-state of Singapore provides an informative study on how state power has 
been subsumed into the charitable landscape through the implementation of charity 
law and regulations. This thesis contends that regulatory power is concurrently an 
artefact of state power and a legitimisation of the state’s cultural control over its 
citizens. Here, the term ‘regulatory power’ refers to the establishment of regulatory 
mechanisms to maintain power relations and to effect state control over the actions 
of its citizens.  
 
Additionally, examining the functions and problems of charity and philanthropy 
reveals the contrasting motivations and expectations that have been imbued into both 
the regulatory framework and civic participation in the charitable landscape. As the 
case study of the National Kidney Foundation (NKF) saga in Singapore illustrates, 
the public’s lack of trust in the regulatory framework then was the impetus for 
governmental intervention. The People’s Action Party (PAP), the country’s ruling 
party since independence, had intervened in the charity crisis to limit the damage to 
its political reputation. This thesis argues that the regulatory framework post-2006 
was an enabling factor in the development of local social enterprises, which became 
an alternative to the government’s model of social service provision and its medium 
to address social needs.  
 
To further enumerate the power relations in Singapore’s charitable landscape, the 
exercise and application of regulatory power are analysed using the five-point power 
relations framework proposed by Michel Foucault. The conceptual analysis unpacks 
how regulatory power shapes charitable actions by relying on the government’s 
ideology of self-reliance as a discourse of ‘truth.’ This thesis further contends that 
social enterprises and the tripartite model of social sector governance extend greater 
social and financial responsibilities to the citizens, thereby justifying the 





Singapore celebrated its Golden Jubilee in 2015, and along with a multiplicity of 
cultural events to commemorate its fiftieth year of independence, there was also an 
observable, coordinated production and (re)presentation of the nation’s past (Han 
2016: 3). On the social front, there were efforts to narrate its founding and progress 
through the lens of philanthropy and social policies, materialising in publications 
such as Philanthropy on the Road to Nationhood in Singapore and 50 Years of Social 
Issues in Singapore in 2015 (Chan 2015; Prakash and Tan 2015). In brief, 
Singapore’s social policies, which encompass social welfare and social development 
policies, are shaped and influenced by its developments and ambitions, whether 
economic or political in nature (Khan 2001: 1).  
 
When surveying the developments in Singapore’s charitable landscape, it is 
necessary to use the National Kidney Foundation Singapore (NKF) saga in 2005 as a 
starting point because it distinguished the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ regulatory 
environment. The charity scandal created lasting change in how the People’s Action 
Party (PAP), the ruling political party since the nation-state’s independence, applied 
regulatory mechanisms to the charity sector. It is also noteworthy that the ensuing 
changes triggered in the regulatory environment produced conditions that were 
conducive to establishing social enterprises (SEs) as an integral part of Singapore’s 
charitable landscape. In particular, the scandal ignited discussions about the 
responsibility of donors as ‘informed givers’ (Khin 2005) and the regulatory 
oversight (and blame) the government should assume when there is a mismatch of 
expectations.  
 
This thesis charts some of the key regulatory changes that have taken place in 
Singapore’s charitable landscape. While it does not purport to be a comprehensive 
historical overview of the diverse changes, it does provide an overview of key 
regulatory developments in the country’s charitable landscape. A timeline to this 
effect is attached as Appendix A. This thesis looks specifically at the NKF saga in 
2005 and considers it as a precursor to the local development of social 
entrepreneurship and SEs, as the saga illustrates the government’s dual role as 
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regulator and facilitator of philanthropic activities. The NKF charity saga also had a 
direct influence on the government’s approach towards the practice of philanthropy 
and fundraising in Singapore, resulting in subsequent amendments to its regulatory 
framework. Finally, the concerted efforts of the Singapore government to guide the 
evolution of its charitable landscape through regulatory mechanisms will be analysed 
from the perspective of how it seeks to use acts of charity and philanthropy to 
advance economic and political agendas. 
 
The Importance of the NKF Saga 
 
As the largest charity in Singapore, NKF, which provides subsidised kidney dialysis 
treatments to kidney patients, was the oft-mentioned role model of the local charity 
sector up until 2004 when the scandal unfolded (Long 2004). It raises a substantial 
amount of charitable donations from its yearly fundraising activities – it collected 
donations of S$67.5 million in 2002 (Tan 2004c) – and receives widespread support 
from both the public and government leaders. Before the scandal, two-thirds of 
Singaporeans were part of its monthly donation programme (Chua 2005b), and the 
wife of Singapore’s former Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong was its patron (ST 
2005a).  
 
In 2004, news that NKF had reserves of S$189 million (Tan 2004c) and was 
planning to provide insurance company Aviva with client referrals in return for S$5 
million sparked public debates about the regulations surrounding charities (Tan 
2004a). The public outrage was further ignited by the anecdotal account of a 
contractor who said a gold-plated tap was installed in the office of the Chief 
Executive Officer, Thambirajah Tharmadurai Durai (TT Durai), in 1995 (Long 
2004). However, the subsequent defamation lawsuits NKF and TT Durai commenced 
against news publisher Singapore Press Holdings and its journalist in July 2005 was 
withdrawn when TT Durai admitted the gold-plated tap had been installed (Wong 
and Low 2005).  
 
TT Durai’s admission during the trial and revelations of other financial 
mismanagement within the charity placed immense public pressure on the 
government to intervene. The government's consistent public support of NKF was 
viewed by the public as an endorsement that added to the charity's reputation. Two 
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days after the collapse of the defamation suits, Health Minister Khaw Boon Wan 
(Khaw) announced the resignation of TT Durai and the NKF board of directors in a 
televised press conference. Mrs Goh also stepped down as the charity’s patron 
(Berger 2005), and within a week, a new board and acting CEO for the charity was 
appointed by Khaw (Wee and Buche 2009: 11). 
 
The release of the independent audit report by accounting firm KPMG in late 2015 
created another crisis for the government because it subsequently received the brunt 
end of the public’s criticism (Wong 2005a). Specifically, the report deemed the 
regulatory environment in Singapore as confusing and ineffective. It detailed the 
failings of the Ministry of Health and National Council of Social Service (NCSS), a 
statutory board, to investigate the charity despite raising concerns about its finances 
and management a few years prior (KPMG 2005: 307, 311-312).  
 
Fears that the scandal will impact public confidence and reduce financial support for 
charities in Singapore were the government's primary motivation in forming an inter-
ministry committee to review regulatory practices and improve the regulatory 
framework (Cheng 2009: 229; Wee and Chong 2009: 20). Also, the forthcoming 
2006 General Election at the time strengthened the government’s commitment to 
retain its electorate and limit the damage to its political reputation as Singapore’s 
dominant ruling party (Reuters 2005). The government’s determination stemmed 
from the intention of opposition political parties to draw parallels between the 
management of the NKF saga and their political rhetoric about the lack of 
transparency and accountability in statutory bodies and government-linked 
companies (Rodan 2006). 
 
Consequently, relevant government bodies were accorded additional legislative 
power to initiate investigations under the new regulatory framework (Wee and Buche 
2009: 34). Charities were required to adhere to a more stringent Code of 
Governance, which placed greater emphasis on greater public disclosure of 
information and stricter regulations governing fundraising and the auditing of their 
financial accounts (Wee and Buche 2009: 17). Although the legislative and 
regulatory changes post-2006 were spurred on by the public’s demands for 
governmental intervention as a result of the NKF saga, the government continues to 
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take the view that the responsibility for the governance of charities lies with their 
board of directors (Wee and Chong 2009: 20-21).  
 
To a certain extent, NKF had benefitted from the “light touch” regime (Tan 2004b) 
and a “hands-off approach” (Khin 2005) that the government desired for the charity 
sector, and they were the impetus for the impressive growth and expansion of NKF 
before the public scandal erupted. The charity had expanded into cancer care with the 
NKF Cancer Fund and had even exported its operating model of kidney dialysis to 
Samoa in the South Pacific (Khaw 2005a). The relative freedom for charities to 
assume various forms of non-profit legal structure also contributed to the increasing 
authority its chief had over the management of NKF (see Yuen, Chandradas, 
Cheong, Blashki, and Muimhneacháin 2013: 15-18).  
 
The State-Facilitated Growth of Social Enterprises 
 
The NKF saga in 2005 can be seen as demarcating the shift in the Singapore 
government’s focus from the traditional non-profit model of charity to the for-profit 
social business model adopted by SEs. As a business entity with a social mission, 
SEs bring focus and resources to areas of unmet or underserved social needs. Even 
though their existence, like charities, can highlight the inadequacy of the 
government, including its reluctance to provide social welfare (Prakash and Tan 
2015: 49), there are key differences between the need and expectation for 
governmental involvement between the two models of meeting social needs. 
 
Charities typically depend on the financial support of donors and government funds 
to meet the needs of their beneficiaries (Prakash and Tan 2014: 10). Even if the costs 
associated with the provision of their services have escalated, they are not in a 
position to negotiate an increase in individual donation amounts by fixing a 
minimum ‘price’ of donations. They are also unable to reliably bargain for more 
grants and subsidies from the government on the basis that they have met their 
intended objectives and are expanding their operations to reach more beneficiaries. 
As charities have a ‘gift relationship’ with their donors, they are legally obligated to 
use the donations only for their intended beneficiaries (O'Halloran 2012: 89). 
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SEs, on the other hand, have more flexibility in responding to market forces, and 
correspondingly, they can set optimum prices because they have a transactional 
relationship with their customers, which is based on the buying and selling of a 
product or service. Unlike charities, SEs are not legally constrained to target only 
select markets or customers, and they have the freedom to tailor different aspects of 
their operations to reach demographics that can generate the highest profit for their 
business. As a commercial entity, they can also seek external sources of funding, 
such as business or foreign investments, and provide financial returns for their 
investors (Prakash and Tan 2014: 10). 
 
Even though both charities and SEs function as the “government’s provision [of 
social services] by proxy” (O'Halloran 2012: 93), there are more incentives for 
governments to promote the ‘market-oriented philanthropy’ embodied by the social 
enterprise model (O'Halloran 2012: 463). Successful social enterprise models can be 
franchised, and their charitable activities can be self-financed. This model of 
philanthropy also reduces the need for the government’s regulatory involvement and 
the responsibility it has to shoulder, especially if there are future allegations of 
mismanagement like the NKF saga. Similar to the expectation for charities in 
Singapore to operate in a “caveat emptor (buyer/donor beware) marketplace” (Cheng 
2009: 235), the same ‘light regulatory touch’ has been applied to SEs. Unlike the US 
and the UK, there is a lack of specific legislations governing the legal structures and 
social missions of SEs in Singapore (Yuen et al. 2013: 10). 
 
By providing assistive financial and regulatory structures to promote the creation of 
SEs, the Singapore government is guiding the channelling of resources and 
marshalling a different approach to philanthropy in meeting social needs. At the 
same time, it is difficult for philanthropic endeavours to be independent of 
government influence. Singapore’s philanthropic ecosystem, an intertwined network 
of funders, corporates, charitable organisations and social service organisations, is 
government-directed through the disbursements of fiscal incentives and government 
funds. Under this ecosystem, the private sector and the community are charged with 
government-mandated roles and responsibilities, such that they become providers 
and facilitators of social welfare provision (Prakash and Tan 2015: 50).  
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Nomenclature: Defining Philanthropy and Other Terms 
 
To provide clarity about the key terms used in this thesis, a contextual understanding 
and definitions of these terms are provided below. The definitions are guided by a 
mix of scholarly literature, and for some of the nomenclature, their legal definitions 
and operational use in Singapore have informed their meanings. It is determined that 
it will be more useful to provide context to the meanings of some of these terms, 
failing which the relationship(s) they have with the charitable landscape might not be 
so immediately understood. To this end, I begin by providing expanded introductions 
to two of the most commonly used terms, philanthropy and charity, as it is necessary 
to see both of them as distinct but interrelated.  
 
Philanthropy and Charity 
 
There are multiple definitions of ‘philanthropy,’ and each of them is altered by the 
time periods and academic disciplines in which they are constructed and/or 
interpreted (Sulek 2009; 2010). As a result, the range of conceptual definitions are 
broad, and at times, dissimilar. However, it is generally agreed by scholars and 
practitioners that philanthropy is a form of private, voluntary action that results in 
public good (Cheng 2009: 17; Eikenberry 2007: 860; Sacks 1960: 517; Sulek 2010: 
205), and individuals create their understanding of philanthropy, and what it entails, 
based on their singular beliefs, values and experiences (Payton and Moody 2008: 21; 
Prakash and Tan 2015: 69; Sacks 1960: 518). 
 
Some scholars have drawn a linear relationship between charity and philanthropy; 
while the two ‘traditions’ are separate, the latter is viewed as an institutionalised 
form of charity and is associated with the welfare state. Succinctly, charity governs 
the practice of benevolence and is a personal act of good by individuals for others 
(Friedman and McGarvie 2004: 30-31), but philanthropy, carried out through 
institutions, seeks practical reform of society and is impersonal (Friedman and 
McGarvie 2004: 37). However, this polar opposite does not mean both traditions 
cannot co-exist because philanthropy can also be regarded as a way of organised, 
private giving that consolidates and directs personal acts of charity (Kidd 1996: 182; 
Payton and Moody 2008: 25; Sulek 2010: 205).  
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Charitable Landscape and Charitable Activities 
 
Charitable landscape refers to the broad arena of charitable activities that occupy any 
given scale. Used as an inclusive term in this thesis, it encompasses all acts of charity 
and philanthropy. Charitable activities, on the other hand, denote activities that are 
benevolent in nature; simply put, they are activities that ‘do’ social good. 
 
Charity and Institutions of a Public Character in Singapore 
 
In Singapore, charities are organisations incorporated using an existing legal form to 
carry out exclusively charitable purposes, and which have been registered as a 
charity under the Charities Act (Leow 2012: 38-41). Institutions of a Public 
Character (IPCs) is a status conferred to qualifying organisations which are then 
subject to additional governance requirements by the government. IPCs do not have 
to be registered as charities, but their activities have to be exclusively beneficial to 
the community in Singapore as a whole. Charitable donations to IPCs are tax-
deductible (Leow 2012: 40-41). 
 
Charitable Purposes in Singapore 
 
The term ‘charitable purposes’ has a specific interpretation in Singapore through the 
Charities Act. Four charitable purposes are recognised but the last, “other purposes 
beneficial to the community,” does not have an explicit legal definition. However, a 
working definition has been recognised and applied by regulatory bodies in 





Regulatory power refers to the implementation of the law and/or regulations to 
maintain the status quo of power relations through the regulatory framework. Thus, 
the position of ruler/subject is defined and enforced by the subject’s actions of 
resistance and submission in the relationship of power. In the context of the 
charitable landscape, regulatory power refers to the state’s assertion of power 
through regulatory mechanisms to influence the charitable actions of citizens. By 
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determining the scope of charitable actions through regulatory mechanisms, 
regulatory power maintains control over the charitable landscape (O'Halloran 2011: 
16; 2012: 96).  
 
Social Sector and Social Innovation 
 
The social sector consists of individuals and organisations engaged in the process of 
social innovation, defined as creating or implementing ideas and solutions to 
alleviate social needs (Payton and Moody 2008: 31). The goal of social innovation is 
to initiate and accelerate social change (Chan 2015: 267). In Singapore, the 
government and the private sector are key stakeholders in the social sector.  
 
Social Enterprises and Social Entrepreneurs 
 
Social enterprises are commercial entities that value social impact above financial 
return and apply business principles and strategies to achieve their social objectives 
(LCSI 2014: 6). They lie on the spectrum between the traditional model of a charity 
and business (Prakash and Tan 2014: 10). Individuals who subscribe to the ideal of 
social innovation and create business entities in their pursuit of social change are 
described as ‘social entrepreneurs.’ (Payton and Moody 2008: 8) 
 
Social Policy  
 
Social policy is a means by which the state exercises governance over the private 
lives of its citizens. It encompasses both direct control through policies and indirect 
control through the propagation of ideology or the funding of non-state organisations 
which complement its social directives (Eikenberry and Nickel 2006: 4). In this 
regard, Singapore’s social policy influences the regulation of its charitable landscape, 
its approach towards social welfare provision, including social welfare policies, and 
how it views the role of charity and philanthropy in society. 
 
Overview of Chapters 
 
In Chapter One, the historical and contemporary practices of charity and 
philanthropy are articulated using a mix of scholarly literature to explicate their 
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functions and problems. Their social and economic benefits, including the 
complexities that result from their dynamic roles in society, are presented as 
intertwined developments. With this background, Chapter Two charts the key 
regulatory developments in Singapore as it responded pragmatically to historical and 
socio-political challenges. As a result, the nation-state capitalised on civic 
participation by implementing regulatory mechanisms in the charitable landscape to 
further its economic and political objectives. 
 
To illustrate the government’s expansive control over the charitable landscape in 
Singapore, Chapter Three will look at the exercise and application of regulatory 
power by using the NKF saga in 2005 as the primary case study. In Chapter Four, the 
final chapter, the five-point analysis of power relations proposed by Michel Foucault 
(1982) will be employed as the conceptual framework to examine the 
implementation and effects of regulatory power in Singapore. The government’s 
discourse of ‘truth’ to rationalise roles and responsibilities in the charitable landscape 
is also put forward as an enabling factor for the development of local SEs.  
 
In summary, this thesis provides a distinct perspective in evaluating developments in 
the practices of charity and philanthropy. It contends that the state and those subject 
to its power are in a push-pull relationship to effect differing agendas in the 
charitable landscape by using regulatory power to (re)articulate each other’s role and 
responsibility. It proposes that the state’s exercise of regulatory power is neither 
guaranteed nor oppressive because citizens have the freedom to (re)negotiate their 
relationship with the state. Henceforth, by neglecting to seek and/or identify 
opportunities to gain control over each other’s actions, the state and citizens become 
liable for their loss of power in the charitable landscape. 
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Chapter 1  – 





This chapter discusses the functions and problems of philanthropy in the context of 
how charity, including philanthropy as an institutionalised practice of charity, has 
been politicised by the government. It examines the complexities that emerge in 
society from the politicisation of charity through government regulations and also 
contends that the public value of philanthropy lies in the associated economic and 
political benefits it brings. Instead of focusing specifically on Singapore, this chapter 
takes a broader view of the practices of charity and philanthropy because the 
evolution of the nation-state’s charitable landscape is situated within international 
developments.  
 
Firstly, from a governmental perspective, philanthropy furthers social and economic 
developments and builds social capital by increasing civic participation in meeting 
social need. The adoption of contemporary models of philanthropy, which takes a 
market-centric approach to addressing social needs, is a means for the government to 
transfer the burden of social service provision by facilitating public-private 
partnerships between the private and non-profit sectors.  
 
Secondly, the problems of philanthropy stem from the government’s shift from being 
an initiator of social services to its role as a regulator of the charitable landscape. The 
government’s withdrawal from the provision of social services, therefore, 
necessitates the implementation of regulatory mechanisms, which facilitates the 
subsequent commercialisation of charity and philanthropy. As a result, the 
communication of social need in the media can reveal an evident ‘disconnect’ 
between the social and political processes that created systemic inequality in society. 
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The Functions of Philanthropy 
 
Harnessing the Wealth of Public Civic-Mindedness 
 
The distinction between charity and philanthropy lies in their functional definitions – 
the term ‘charity’ originates from Christianity whereas ‘philanthropy’ was associated 
with the period of Enlightenment (Friedman and McGarvie 2004: 31). The aim of 
this observation is to note that the historical context in which ‘philanthropy’ was 
conceived is different from that of ‘charity.’ In contrast to charity, philanthropy 
“serve[s] as vehicles for advancing the economic and social interests of their 
benefactors” (Acs and Phillips 2002: 197). For instance, the founding of private 
American research universities such as Stanford and Carnegie-Mellon was an 
investment of individual wealth into social institutions which created a positive 
impact on America’s economic growth through their production of knowledge (Acs 
and Phillips 2002: 193). 
 
Notably, the creation of early philanthropic foundations by leading figures from the 
banking and industry sectors occurred in response to the challenges faced by the 
development of industrial society in the West. The transition from a rural to urban 
society had been characterised by issues such as urban poverty and industrial 
conflicts. Therefore, by establishing foundations, their founders were able to exert 
influence over the evolution of the industrial society and how its associated 
challenges were resolved (Karl 1997: 208-209). The focus of American philanthropic 
foundations to provide universal access to education was not incidental because the 
development of an industrial society had led to a demand for leaders who were 
trained in science and technology (Karl 1997: 211).  
 
As a further example, the first philanthropic venture in late seventeenth-century 
England was created by London’s Foundling Hospital. The founders wanted to save 
and educate abandoned and illegitimate children who would then be able to make 
productive contributions to England’s economic growth (Friedman and McGarvie 
2004: 37). The early practice of philanthropy in London was guided by a form of 
civic-mindedness that acknowledged the economic benefits of promoting ventures 
for the public good. Nevertheless, it was a civic-mindedness that included an 
additional pragmatic impetus beyond the original notion of charity as an expression 
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of ‘love to mankind’ (Friedman and McGarvie 2004: 37). Without discounting the 
multifarious contributions of philanthropy throughout history, it remains apparent 
that philanthropy has a paramount role in the process of wealth creation by 
complementing social and economic developments, and by extension, in creating 
economic prosperity for a country (Acs and Phillips 2002: 189). 
 
In the US, philanthropy is recognised for making substantial contributions to its 
social, economic and political stability. America’s model of entrepreneurial 
capitalism has a dual focus on entrepreneurship and philanthropy – entrepreneurship 
accumulates wealth, but philanthropy reconstitutes wealth and catalyses further 
opportunities to create wealth (Acs and Phillips 2002: 189). Similarly, in recent 
years, there is a renewed focus on the paradigm that the dawdling resolve and 
resources plaguing the social sector can be bypassed through social impact investing 
and social-purpose finance, which relies on market-driven tools and financial 
instruments to induce social transformation (Salamon 2014: 34).  
 
Governments, together with the private and non-profit sectors, are finding novel 
ways of leveraging on each other’s resources to solve social problems. This 
development results from the heavy reliance of charities on the government as a 
donor (O'Halloran 2012: 463). In other words, philanthropy transpires within the 
juxtaposition of human nature as being simultaneously the cause and solution to 
societal problems (Moody and Breeze 2016: 15). As governments increasingly 
withdraw from the provision of public service and entrust this responsibility to the 
non-profit sector (O'Halloran 2011: 3), the practice of contemporary philanthropy 
has also evolved. 
 
As a result, new philanthropic tools and institutions such as capital aggregators, 
social enterprise brokers and social investment funds have been created to meet 
social needs in a capitalist market (Salamon 2014: 32). Nicknamed 
“philanthrocapitalism,” this contemporary adaptation of philanthropy uses business 
principles and market mechanisms to spark social transformation (Edwards 2008: 
12). For example, social enterprises (SEs) are touted to usher in “a new era of 
entrepreneurial capitalism where for-profits serve society,” and they have legal 
structures and rights in American law (Blodge, Melconian, and Peterson 2016: 314).  
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This elevated preference for SEs also reflects the government’s intention to distribute 
the responsibility and liability of social service provision. The legal recognition of 
philanthropic institutions such as SEs makes it clear that the progress and 
development of philanthropy remain shaped by and is a response to “the political 
forces of order and the economic forces of the market” (Moody and Breeze 2016: 
15). From this perspective, the public values of philanthropy are realised through 
safeguarding the country’s economic security because it results in the public having 
heightened trust in public institutions, public policymakers and the existing 
capitalistic system of the economy (Mendel 2014: 24).  
 
Fostering Civic Participation to Consolidate Civil Society 
 
Regardless whether it is a personal act of charity or private giving through 
philanthropy, charitable giving is viewed as a form of participation in civic life 
(Bekkers and Wiepking 2010: 4). Social capital is considered an important driver for 
charitable behaviours (Brown and Ferris 2007: 96-97), but there is contention over 
whether social capital is a property an individual possesses or the attribute of a 
community (Portes 2000: 3). However, the point here is to disentangle the communal 
exhibition of social capital as synonymous with ‘civicness’ because civic-
mindedness is not always the corollary of social capital (see Portes 2000: 4-5).  
 
In addition, the broad applicability of social capital by scholars to explain its 
community-level impacts entails a definition that can quantify its supposed impacts 
(see Saxton and Benson 2005: 24). Within this thesis, social capital is defined as an 
aggregate of “the networks of community and the norms of trust and reciprocity that 
facilitate collective action” (Brown and Ferris 2007: 86). Individuals can create and 
accumulate two types of social capital – network-based and norm-based social 
capital. The former indicates how embedded individuals are in their community or 
personal networks, and the latter refers to the faith and trust individuals have in 
others and civic institutions (Brown and Ferris 2007: 88-89).  
 
For example, community-led philanthropic efforts by the Chinese clan associations 
after World War II met prevailing social needs in Singapore and made beneficial 
advancements in health, welfare and education (Prakash and Tan 2015: 15). In this 
case, the Chinese clan associations cultivated a sense of commonality among 
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individuals and spurred them to help their clan members and the broader community 
they were part of. These acts of benevolence, which were directed towards 
individuals of Chinese ethnicity and those of the same religious faith (Maisharah 
2008: 17), parallel the observation that each type of social capital manifests itself in 
different charitable behaviours (Brown and Ferris 2007: 94-95). 
 
When it comes to an individual’s ‘stock’ of social capital, network-based and norm-
based social capital have the biggest impact on an individual’s secular giving and 
volunteering respectively. For secular giving, individuals who were more embedded 
in their network of relationships had a higher likelihood of supporting secular causes 
through their charitable giving. Volunteering, on the other hand, was influenced by 
the faith and trust individuals have in others and civic institutions (Brown and Ferris 
2007: 94-95). Complementary to this, it is noted that social entrepreneurs gain a 
sense of individual empowerment when they initiate philanthropic activities because 
they acquire “ownership of community-based solutions” (Prakash and Tan 2015: 68).  
 
It can be posited that turning to philanthropic models like SEs to solve social 
problems signifies a lack of faith and trust in civic institutions and others to address 
social needs. To a degree, engagement in social innovation is preceded by a lack of 
faith and trust in civic institutions and others. With the understanding of how each 
type of social capital influence different charitable behaviours, it can be contended 
that the creation of SEs is an outcome of social entrepreneurs having a high network-
based social capital. The strong relationships social entrepreneurs have with their 
networks precipitate their demonstration of social innovation. Therefore, it is not 
counterintuitive for governments to encourage citizens to take a keen interest in 
catalysing community-initiated solutions. In fact, engaging in social innovation 
integrates them more deeply into their community and personal networks. 
 
Compared to the norm of reciprocity and participation in formal organisations, the 
possession of interpersonal trust does not yield a significant impact on philanthropic 
behaviour (Layton and Moreno 2014: 212-213). Thus, cultivating interpersonal trust 
need not be a crucial strategy to increase civic engagement in solving social 
problems. Instead, creating opportunities for individuals to deepen their formal 
networks of association and increasing public trust in civic institutions through a 
robust regulatory framework will foster charitable behaviours and greater civic 
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participation in solving social problems (Brown and Ferris 2007: 90). As a result, 
greater levels of civic participation to solve social problems in the community 
consolidates civil society and prevents social divisiveness (O'Halloran 2012: 91).  
 
The Problems of Philanthropy 
 
Charitable Activities in the Public Arena 
 
Philanthropy is sometimes referred to as part of the third, or independent, sector and 
it is considered to be an alternative to business and the government (Karl 1997: 207; 
Salamon, Anheier, and Associates 1999: 3). However, as it is pointed out:  
All forms of philanthropy have always fulfilled functions that governments 
have found useful substitutes for or adjuncts to their responsibilities. The only 
real distinctions depend on another set of our definitions: those of power and 
authority and law. (Karl 1997: 207) 
Governing the practices of charity and philanthropy require them to be placed under 
the purview of the state. Governments define what is considered ‘charitable’ under 
the law and then establish legal and regulatory boundaries to oversee charities and 
their activities. In this way, governments politicise the act of charity.  
 
Modern charity law affects the construct of charities and the legal recognition of 
their charitable activities. With the government receding from its responsibility to 
provide social services, the enactment of modern charity law bears a clear intention 
to use donor incentive schemes to drive preferential financial support towards select 
charitable organisations. Using the law to regulate charity politicises it because it 
highlights the problem of the government's withdrawal from providing public 
services (O'Halloran 2011: 3). The considerable loss of tax revenue from tax-
deductible charitable donations is the reason governments take a definite stake in the 
gifting relationship by determining, defining and influencing the construct of 
charities, their governance and their activities (O'Halloran 2011: 16).  
 
Governments intend to use fiscal incentives to influence which charities receive 
greater public and financial support. Their intention has to be understood from the 
perspective that money contains the power to mobilise people and resources. While 
the legal value of money is immutable when it is transacted in the form of coins or 
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notes, its inherent value is derived from the link it builds between products and 
places. A person or place can, thus, exercise power over other individuals and places 
even though they are physically far apart (Latour 1986: 31). Administering the flow 
of money to charitable causes influences the relationships that will be built. 
Furthermore, having control over the channelling of financial resources allows 
governments to guide and determine how social change is carried out in society.  
 
In short, advancements towards social change articulates the success of 
governmental regulations in the charitable landscape, whereas the scarcity of social 
change is attributed to ineffective sectoral regulations. The government’s 
responsibility, then, is to ‘solve’ social needs by ensuring there are assistive sectoral 
regulations. The cultivation of a flourishing charitable landscape, however, is 
premised on encouraging external parties to initiate and take on the responsibility of 
meeting social needs. In doing so, social change becomes attached to and becomes 
an attribute of the governments’ regulatory framework, thereby legitimising their 
binary roles as regulators of the charitable landscape and facilitators of philanthropy. 
 
Government-charity partnerships were premised on the widening gap between 
governments and their electorate. During the twenty-first century, places like the US, 
the UK, Canada, Australia and Singapore had a simultaneous reformation of charity 
law. The purpose of modernising charity law was not only aimed at addressing the 
limitations of the Pemsel classification of charitable purposes – the charity law of 
common law nations is based on this classification. The legislative amendments were 
means to achieve greater social cohesion by redefining the role of charity in society, 
and its relationship between governments and their citizens. In other words, 
regulating charity eventually had the effect of “[d]rafting the architecture for civil 
society” (O'Halloran 2011: 105-108). 
 
Governments have a vested interest in managing the practice of charity and its 
resulting charitable activities, including philanthropic activities, because they are 
carried out in the public arena. In itself, the practice of charity constitutes a political 
act because it disrupts the dominant discourses, codes and identities in society 
(Carroll and Ratner 1999: 2). When individuals in democracies see private giving 
and the non-profit sector as a means to solve societal problems, they politicise their 
giving because they are inadvertently articulating alternatives to the government 
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(Payton and Moody 2008: 13). By supporting efforts for social transformation and 
bringing awareness to unjust social conditions, individuals carry out forms of 
counter-hegemonic communication because they are critiquing the current social and 
material conditions  (Carroll and Ratner 1999: 2).  
 
Governments can become the unintended casualty if they do not live up to the 
expectations of its citizens in solving social problems (Livingstone 2013: 351-352). 
There are implications when additional actors participate in the “global civil society” 
(Lee 2010: 79). Social institutions with international and transnational reach impinge 
into the local civil society space when they influence the directions of the 
governments’ public policies. For these reasons, governments use the regulatory 
framework to maintain their jurisdiction over the charitable landscape and delegate 
the institutional infrastructures of philanthropy as ministerial responsibilities 
(O'Halloran 2012: 96).  
 
Committing the scope and definition of ‘charitable purposes’ into statute accords 
countries like New Zealand, Singapore and the UK the ease of making future 
alterations to their charity legislations. Additionally, it presents governments with 
greater political control and influence over the practice of charity (O'Halloran 2011: 
112-113). As concurrent regulators and superintendents of charities and charitable 
activities, governments are thus able to delegate responsibilities, decrease their 
perceived obligations and diminish their culpability because “state-sponsored 
collective action” has been replaced with the facilitation of philanthropy and 
voluntary action (Eikenberry 2007: 858).  
 
Commercialising the Benefits of Charity and Philanthropy 
 
As noted earlier in the introduction chapter, an act of charity denotes a personal act 
of good by individuals for others (Friedman and McGarvie 2004: 30-31) whereas 
philanthropy is regarded as consolidating acts of charity through the structure of an 
institution (Kidd 1996: 182; Payton and Moody 2008: 25; Sulek 2010: 205). Besides 
fulfilling demands for public goods that the government had failed to satisfy or 
complementing their delivery of public goods, the non-profit sector has what Young 
refers to as an “adversarial relationship of mutual responsibility” (Young 2000: 150-
151). In this adversarial relationship, the government and non-profit organisations 
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are seen to work in reciprocity to shape the policy and regulatory environment to 
maintain public accountability while furthering separate agendas.  
 
Importantly, institutions of philanthropy have the ability and capacity to guide the 
formulation of public policies. They assume stewardship for various stages of policy 
developments by their capacity to nurture and realise the public values of 
philanthropy. As the strategic partners of governments in the public arena, 
philanthropic institutions increase the public’s trust in policymakers and public 
institutions when they fulfil their social mission and stimulate policy and societal 
changes. This view provides meaningful context when examining three areas: the 
complexities that arise from commercialising acts of charity in society; the 
subsequent impacts on the practice of philanthropy; and the market-centric direction 
philanthropic institutions later took in addressing social needs (Mendel 2014: 24-27).  
 
It is argued that the discussion of ‘needs delivery’ and ‘needs interpretation’ blinds 
us from the “politics of need” when philanthropists are allowed to determine the 
urgency and importance of particular social needs (Eikenberry and Nickel 2006: 7).  
“Who gets to establish authoritative thick definitions of people’s needs” is 
precisely what is at stake in the current emphasis on governance, which often 
delegates such authority to philanthropists who have already benefitted from 
a definition of needs that allowed them to amass enough wealth that they are 
able to establish their own means of delivering social policy independent of 
the state. (Eikenberry and Nickel 2006: 7-8) 
Involving philanthropists in the discussion of social need is an attempt to depoliticize 
the government’s retrenchment of state responsibility. Simply put, governance is a 
reprivatisation of social policy (Nickel and Eikenberry 2010: 269).  
 
There are arguments that the ideology of the value and importance of philanthropy in 
society underlies its search for legitimacy through the adoption of professionalisation 
and marketization (Eikenberry 2013: 7). The importation of business concepts, 
strategies and measurements to the practice of philanthropy has resulted in a 
“business-like service delivery” of meeting social needs (Dart 2004: 298). Therefore, 
the subsequent market-centric direction philanthropy took in addressing social needs 
is perceived to be the product of a push-pull relationship in the public-private 
partnership between the government and the non-profit sector (Mendel 2014: 27).  
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Terms such as “philanthrocapitalism” (Edwards 2008: 12) and “marketized 
philanthropy” – where benevolence is subordinated to the ‘laws’ of the market – are 
used to describe the commonplace development of commercialised philanthropy 
(Nickel and Eikenberry 2009: 975). Celebrity philanthropy, the media-hyped 
involvement of celebrities in charitable activities, and consumption philanthropy, 
which affiliates purchases with charitable causes, are considered commercialised 
forms of philanthropy. Other examples of similar philanthropic models include 
foundations which use market-based solutions to solve social problems and the 
formation of SEs as a business-social hybrid model to self-finance their respective 
philanthropic goals (Chan 2015: 250-251).  
 
In another view, acts of charity are turned into a form and reproduction of capitalism 
when they are commodified and ‘fetishised’ as cultural products (Livingstone 2013: 
347-348). The gist of the repressiveness embodied by this form of philanthropy is 
explained as such: 
Consumption philanthropy demands that we conform to the ontology of the 
market as a means to be benevolent, but it actually feeds on genuine 
benevolent spirit, which it traps in a philanthropy uncritically narrated by 
consumption. (Nickel and Eikenberry 2009: 979-980) 
From this perspective, philanthropy becomes “infinitely expandable in scale and 
conveniently malleable in scope” when seen as being the best solution to address 
social needs (Payton and Moody 2008: 11). 
 
Unlike commercial entities, the greatest measure of a charity’s success should be its 
demise, not its growth (Cheng 2009: 53). However, by treating the ‘ills’ of modern 
capitalism with marketized philanthropy instead of creating viable alternatives, 
charity perpetuates the need for its existence (Livingstone 2013: 350-351). By 
searching for social transformation through marketized philanthropy, the 
benevolence of philanthropy is turned into an exploitation of the market (Nickel and 
Eikenberry 2009: 985). The transformative potential of philanthropy, henceforth, 
becomes constrained (Nickel and Eikenberry 2009: 975); its existence only prevents 
the worsening of social problems and frees the government from taking state action 
or responsibility (Livingstone 2013: 347-348). By channelling the people’s anger and 
discontent against social problems into productive social action, the practices of 
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charity and philanthropy become the medium of and alternatives to the state 
(Livingstone 2013: 351-352). 
 
The ‘Disconnect’ in Communicating Social Need 
 
This section focuses on the communication of social need through the media. It has 
been established that charitable giving is political and that the practices of charity 
and philanthropy have been politicised through the government’s regulatory 
mechanisms. As Webb and Wong’s (2014) study on Singaporean giving shows, 
donation behaviours are not acts of spontaneity driven by intrinsic motivation but 
instead, originate from external prompts and enticement. Equally important, media 
stories orchestrate everyday consciousness and are a definitive version of the reality 
readers cannot experience for themselves (Kensicki 2004: 54). The awareness and 
comprehension of social needs are contingent on how they are communicated. 
 
An awareness of need is the antecedent of giving behaviour. The communication of 
social need plays a major role in increasing the incidence of donation behaviours 
(Bekkers and Wiepking 2010: 6). Therefore, to gauge the media’s communication of 
social need simply as a matter of currency or newsworthiness disregards the power 
play at work (Driessens, Joye, and Biltereyst 2010: 711). After all, the production of 
news is not a democratic process but a hegemonic system of power. The production 
and consumption of news would either challenge or reinforce “dominant cultural and 
political frames” (Carroll and Ratner 1999: 2).  
 
In the current mediatised society, the communication of need is increasingly 
facilitated through mediated quasi-interaction. This form of interaction is distinct 
from unmediated face-to-face interaction and mediated person-to-person interaction 
because the latter two are dialogical and oriented towards specific ‘others.’ Mediated 
quasi-interaction, on the other hand, is monological and can be directed towards an 
indefinite range of recipients (Silk 1998: 170-171). Charity music videos and charity 
telethons are examples of mediated quasi-interactions. Unmediated face-to-face and 
mediated person-to-person interactions can give rise to “caring at a distance” – where 
individuals can act and respond to actions and events happening in distant locales 
(Silk 1998: 168). Nonetheless, producers and recipients of mediated quasi-interaction 
are neither obligated nor responsible for each other’s responses (Silk 1998: 171). 
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Communicating the mediated reality of social problems brings with it certain 
contradictions. For instance, charity music videos simultaneously challenge and 
reinforce existing cultural and political frames but they do not upset state and 
corporate powers. As fundraising tools, charity music videos elicit compassion from 
viewers without them gaining ‘compassion fatigue’ from the visual bombardment of 
social problems. At the same time, they prevent ‘suffering’ from becoming devalued 
as a ‘charity commodity’ due to its overuse. The polysemic representations of 
suffering and the distant ‘Other’ have also become another avenue to advertise 
commodities like fashion or celebrities in charity music videos (Louise Davis 2015: 
1212-1215). In this instance, although mediated quasi-interaction aids and extends 
the communication of social problems, the relationship of the viewers to the intended 
beneficiaries is rendered invisible. 
 
When social problems are disconnected from their “spatial dimension and structural 
causes,” they turn reality into a “mediated abstraction.” As a result, they absolve and 
minimise both “individual and governmental responsibilities for resolving the 
broader political, social and cultural inequalities associated with globalization” 
(Driessens, Joye, and Biltereyst 2010: 712). One example is the pervasiveness of 
charity telethons as a form of charitainment, where instances of distant suffering, 
such as victims of natural disasters, are portrayed as being remedied when viewers 
contribute towards disaster aid relief (Driessens, Joye, and Biltereyst 2010: 709-710). 
The media offers a way not only for donors to consume information about the 
marginal effects of their giving (Wong, Chua, and Vasoo 1998). Importantly, 
viewers derive the reciprocity of their gifts from the media’s representation of their 
generosity in ‘meeting’ social needs (Kidd 1996: 186-187). Consuming these forms 
of media representation also enables viewers to gain a false sense of control over 
distant suffering and their ability to create social change (Louise Davis 2015: 1216). 
 
The disconnect from the causes of social problems is propelled by the “sign-value” 
of consumption philanthropy, which links purchases to the message that 
consumption is a suitable, utilitarian substitute for creating social change (Nickel and 
Eikenberry 2009: 979-980). The expectation of reciprocity is central to sustaining the 
gift cycle. Giving is an act that connotes both interest and obligations by the giver. 
The charitable gift is not ‘free’ and comes attached with explicit and implicit 
conditions the moment it is given or received (Kidd 1996: 183-184). Thus, acts of 
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gifting form relationships between donors and recipients, including the internal 
relationships donors form with their values (Kidd 1996: 187-189).  
 
The critical weakness of consumption philanthropy is that it “individualizes solutions 
to collective social problems” by presenting the act of purchase as a charitable 
donation (Eikenberry 2009a: 52-53). The Gap (PRODUCT) REDTM campaign, for 
instance, thrives on forming these types of association. Buying a red t-shirt is likened 
to helping to save the world and wearing it implies the consumer advocates and 
supports social change (Nickel and Eikenberry 2009: 979-980). However, the 
ideology of the market is “essentially antisocial, based on self-interest rather than 
disinterest or the public good” (Eikenberry 2009b: 538). Despite allowing consumers 
to participate in the “easy virtue” of consumption philanthropy (Eikenberry 2009a: 
53), this form of marketized philanthropy essentially elevates consumer actions over 
citizen responsibilities.  
 
Moreover, the structure of the market is viewed as the opposite of civil society. The 
former is based on individualistic actions, but the latter is built through collective 
action: “Market freedom is the freedom to disconnect, to treat others as objects” 
(Edwards 2008: 61). In reality, supporters of consumption philanthropy and its close 
affiliate, celebrity philanthropy, are desensitised to the social processes that produced 
these inequalities. As a result, they feel no contradiction in their participation of 




As the overview of the historical origins and contemporary developments of charity 
and philanthropy shows, both individual and government actions in creating and 
facilitating charitable activities have pragmatic purposes that are beyond the scope of 
‘love to mankind.’ Consequently, the functions of philanthropy are defined by the 
purposes that governments and individuals impose onto its role in society. However, 
the role of philanthropy is not simply to address social needs but also to reap the 
associated social and economic benefits, of which the foremost is legitimising the 
existence of governments and charitable organisations.  
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On the other hand, by requiring philanthropy to conform to the regulatory framework 
and subjecting it to the structure of a capitalistic market, philanthropy is both 
politicised and commercialised. As a mean to further the differing aims of 
governments and charitable organisations in meeting social needs, the dissonance 
between their differing expectations of philanthropy results in a disconnect between 
the communication of need and the structural causes of inequality. Therefore, even 
though the practice of philanthropy has public value and is for the public good, its 
power to effect transformative structural changes in society is constrained.  
 
As Chapter Two will illustrate, the charitable landscape in Singapore embodies many 
of the functions and problems of philanthropy detailed in this chapter. Importantly, it 
delineates how charity law and regulations have been used by the Singapore 
government to foster charitable behaviours for the purposes of fulfilling its economic 
and political objectives. 
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Chapter 2  – 




It is imperative to note that the People Action Party’s (PAP) interventionist policies 
from the early days of the country’s independence have carried through to its social 
policies and its view on the practices of charity and philanthropy. The regulatory 
framework governing the charitable landscape is angled towards enhancing 
economic objectives and to an extent, ensuring political stability to guarantee 
unbridled economic growth (Lee 2010: 4). The promise of economic prosperity, after 
all, is the government’s de rigueur means of legitimising and rationalising its 
authoritarian rule (Rodan 1998: 66-67). 
 
As highlighted by Khan (2001) in her paper Social Policy in Singapore: A Confucian 
Model?, the government’s policies bolster the country’s economic growth, and its 
approach of economic pragmatism is also reflected in its social policies: 
However, as the [social] policies are mainly motivated by “efficiency” and 
“pragmatism,” the long-term objective of the government is to reduce such 
subsidies so that the problem of excess demand for social services (resulting 
in what is known as the “free rider problem”) can be avoided. The 
government also has refrained from making any firm commitments to 
equality and welfare to avoid conflicts with its growth objective, which 
constituted the foremost and single-minded priority of state action. (Khan 
2001: 1) 
Keeping this in mind, developments in Singapore’s charitable landscape and the 
government’s subsequent embrace of social enterprises (SEs) must be understood 
chiefly as an economic strategy, or, as means of achieving economic objectives.  
 
This chapter analyses the Singapore government’s economic and political rationales 
in regulating the charitable landscape. It details regulatory governance of the 
charitable landscape from the vantage of how Singapore’s notion of nationhood and 
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construct of national identity have been harnessed to increase civic participation in 
addressing social needs. It also addresses the historical and contemporary struggles 
Singapore faced, and how these challenges were mitigated by leveraging on civic 
participation, and later, the public sector’s involvement in the social service sector. 
 
The Ideology Behind Giving 
 
Distinct stages of change in Singapore’s charitable landscape can be discerned via 
the political and economic developments of the nation-state. Singapore’s 
interventionist government prioritises and derives legitimacy from its ability to beget 
economic growth (Lee and Morris 2016: 286). It believes that social development is 
a tributary to economic growth (Lim 2015a: 327). In fact, integrating the practices of 
charity and philanthropy into the its regulatory framework is an offshoot of the 
government’s identification as a welfare-state regime, where “in the relation between 
state and economy a complex of legal and organizational features are systematically 
interwoven” (Holliday 2000: 707-708).  
 
Creating the Founding Myths of Singapore 
 
At this juncture, it is important to explain that Singapore’s nationhood is founded on 
the two ‘myths’ of multiracialism and meritocracy, which are underpinned by the 
ethos of self-reliance (Lee 2011: 262). In the case of Singapore, its nation building 
approach draws on a series of founding myths, which constitute its national culture 
and informs its public policy (Hill and Lian 2003b: 14). As a form of political 
integration, the political leadership confers its citizens with identities that 
complement their political agendas. The myths are then “internalized by 
Singaporeans through a variety of mechanisms of socialization including education, 
public ceremonies and the media” (Hill and Lian 2003b: 34). The utilisation of these 
myths is an effect of the PAP's pervasive ideology of pragmatism, which considers 
social and political stability to be wrought by economic growth and development 
(Lee 2010: 4).  
 
Succinctly, multiracialism refers to cultural tolerance and acceptance of differences 
between races. By ensuring that each ethnic group has equal opportunities to achieve 
social mobility by virtue of their hard work, meritocracy depoliticizes ethnicity and 
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encourages individuals to strive for economic achievements (Hill and Lian 2003a: 
102). These myths galvanise civic participation in the social sector and validate the 
merits of a welfare system based on the discourse of Asian values (Walker and Wong 
2013: 99). These ‘values’ discourage individualism and place “familial and 
communal units as the basic building blocks of society” (Prakash and Tan 2015: 39), 
thereby instilling self-reliance and communitarianism. These values are important 
because the government’s ensuing creation of a national identity is based on these 
two myths. In addition, the country’s governmental policies and practices solidify 
this national identity work by perpetuating the founding myths.  
 
In the following sections within this chapter, it becomes apparent that the 
government’s approach to the provision of social welfare draws heavily on the myths 
of multiracialism and meritocracy. The national identity of Singapore espouses the 
ideological and pragmatic applications of the founding myths, and the two myths 
frame expectations around both state and individual responsibilities. Its national 
identity unites its multi-ethnic population in making individual contributions for the 
collective, whether at the level of the community or the state. 
 
The Understated Risks of Community Philanthropy  
 
In the early days of Singapore’s colonial past, mutual self-help groups pioneered 
charitable initiatives that were directed at individual recipients who share the same 
ethnic or religious backgrounds. Subsequently, the establishment of the Department 
of Social Welfare (DSW) coordinated the delivery of social services and facilitated 
the shift of social welfare provision to one that is based on locality through its loose 
network of community centres (Maisharah 2008: 17-18). This notion of ‘community’ 
is a recurring theme in the government’s rhetoric of its national identity and features 
prominently in its ensuing social policies and regulations of the charitable landscape. 
 
For instance, community philanthropy was able to unite transient migrants in 
rebuilding Singapore after the Second World War, (Prakash and Tan 2015: 12-13). 
However, the Chinese population in pre-independent Singapore was not particularly 
supportive of multiracialism (Hill and Lian 2003b: 4); thus, the government feared 
that Chinese chauvinism would take root through these vernacular schools and 
interfere with its aspiration to merge with Malaysia (Hill and Lian 2003a: 93). As 
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Singapore’s ruling party since its independence, the PAP later benefitted from the 
hindsight that, if unchecked, charitable behaviours can propel ideologies that are in 
opposition to its state objectives. 
 
A few Chinese clan associations who provided social services also begun to extend 
their influence into the political sphere through their support for political parties. As 
different groups sought to gain political ground within the new nation-state, the 
social service sector became a fertile ground to campaign for political control. It 
became evident that charitable organisations are not only operating within the 
confines of the social service sector; their advocacy efforts extend into the arena of 
politics because a favourable political environment was deemed important for their 
social objectives (Maisharah 2008: 18). Eventually, under the leadership of the PAP, 
community philanthropic efforts began to be formalised through their registration as 
charities and voluntary welfare organisations (Prakash and Tan 2015: 23).  
 
The formation of the Singapore Council of Social Service (SCSS), a statutory 
authority established in 1958, further integrated the provision of social service into 
the government’s modus operandi (Maisharah 2008: 21). The government has a 
vested interest in strengthening the social service sector and building social 
infrastructure and services because meeting social needs were crucial to achieving its 
economic objectives (Hill and Lian 2003b: 2). Thus, the provision of essential social 
services like housing, education and healthcare were delegated to the government, 
while the SCSS provided remedial services like firefighting and disaster relief 
(NCSS 2008: 6-7).  
 
In 1960, the PAP formed the People’s Association, its grassroots arm, to oversee its 
network of Community Centres, Residents’ Committees and Citizen’s Consultative 
Committees. Besides providing social programmes, these parapolitical structures 
consolidated the PAP’s political power and served as intermediaries between the 
government and the citizens. The addition of 121 new community centres between 
1962 and 1963, and the creation of the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of 
Education, further diminished the control the Chinese clan associations had in the 
charitable landscape (Prakash and Tan 2015: 22-24).  
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As a result, the Chinese clan associations turned their attention to less mainstream 
areas of social needs that were not met by the government, such as those relating to 
divorcees or migrant workers (Prakash and Tan 2015: 34-35). This shift in focus by 
charitable organisations to address segments of social needs the government does not 
prioritise will eventually be cast as an oblique mandate for the charitable landscape. 
Likewise, the government’s push for active civic participation in the practices of 
charity and philanthropy is presented as the responsibility of citizens who are 
members of their community and their country (Hill and Lian 2003b: 8). By 
emphasising individual responsibility, the government shifted the obligation of 
addressing social needs from the state to the citizens (Prakash and Tan 2015: 49). 
 
The Era of Social Innovation 
 
The “Many Helping Hands” Approach 
 
Singapore's historical past – including the government's narrativization of its past – 
have shaped its views towards the practices of charity and philanthropy. This section 
elucidates how the Many Helping Hands (MHH) approach is pragmatically applied 
to the charitable landscape to steer charitable behaviours. Attention is focused on the 
MHH approach, which relies on a community-based approach to provide social 
services, as its target groups are the beneficiaries of the charitable landscape (NUS 
2015: 9). In other words, charitable activities in Singapore responded and arose out 
of gaps in its social safety net. 
 
Under the MHH approach, social assistance is rendered by the government and the 
community only after individuals are unable to be self-reliant and have exhausted 
their family’s support (NUS 2015: 2). The government acknowledged it is seeking 
new directions in its social policies, but its focus remains on the ethos of self-
reliance: 
It may seem like a paradox, but this tension between having a more effective 
safety net and having that sense of self-reliance must always be there. It is not 
about leaving families to face uncertainties on their own. Rather it is a 
strategy of government support for individuals to learn and strive to achieve 
their aspirations. It's about state activism that is supportive of individual 
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efforts that helps (sic) people to stand with pride and contribute to society. 
(Wong 2015b) 
In other words, the practice of “state activism” is premised on supporting the efforts 
of individuals to access the resources of their family and community.  
 
This “strategy of government support” has considerable influence in why the country 
is strongly encouraging and facilitating the development of social entrepreneurship. 
To the government, local SEs are the “middle sector between the traditional walls of 
government, non-profits and business” (Tan 2015a). Rather than having the 
‘community’ alleviate social needs with the government as the main funder, SEs take 
on the gamut of social and financial responsibilities associated with meeting social 
needs. Hence, the MHH approach furnishes the government with a wide latitude in 
allocating resources because the founding myths of multiracialism and meritocracy 
justify its laissez-faire approach to welfare provision (Chong and Ng 2016: 4). 
 
The Tripartite Model and the Legal Regulations of Charity 
 
Post-independence, the PAP continued to increase governmental and regulatory 
management over both the charitable landscape and civic participation in addressing 
social needs. A key development was the emergence of the tripartite model of 
government, which has the government, private sector and the public share the 
responsibilities of meeting social needs. In fact, implementing the tripartite model of 
social service governance extends the MHH approach. Under the tripartite model, the 
notion of ‘community’ is broadened to include the private sector and non-
governmental organisations, like charities and Institutions of a Public Character 
(IPCs), as stakeholders in the social service sector (Prakash and Tan 2015: 29). This 
section expounds on the impact of this partnership model in Singapore and 
emphasises the regulations surrounding tax deductions for monetary donations to 
charities and IPCs. 
 
From the government’s view, welfare erodes self-reliance and is antithetical to a 
meritocratic society (Chong and Ng 2016: 4). Early on, its social policy is premised 
on giving its citizens low-cost access to “welfare-enhancing infrastructure and 
services” like housing, secondary health care and tertiary education (Lim 2015a: 
329). Rather than fund income maintenance programmes like public pensions, 
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Singapore’s primary modes of social provision comprise of the ownership of public 
housing; education as a ‘meritocratic advancement’ towards social mobility; and the 
Central Provident Fund, a national compulsory savings and retirement scheme (Lim 
2015a: 344-345).  
 
In addition, Singapore’s flexible labour market and arm’s length capital investment 
environment do not provide incentives for external investments in social 
infrastructure and services (Lim 2015a: 344-345). Hence, the government became 
the primary provider of social infrastructure and services (Lim 2015a: 329). It is the 
largest funder of non-profit organisations in the country, providing nearly three-
quarters of their funding support (LCSI 2014: 62). Given that the costs of providing 
social services are increasing, the risk is that governments cannot sustainably fund 
charities for the longer haul (O'Halloran 2012: 463). By adopting the tripartite model 
of government in the social sector, the Singapore government distributes the costs of 
providing social services. 
 
Launched in 1983, the Community Chest (ComChest) was one of the earliest forms 
of tripartite partnership in Singapore. It created the opportunity for employees and 
the private sector to contribute to charitable causes through monthly payroll 
contributions and donation-matching respectively (NCSS 2008: 56-57). Donors, 
however, cannot earmark their donations for specific charities because the ComChest 
retains the prerogative to distribute the money (Chua and Wong 2003: 439). Despite 
this lack of choice, donors are incentivised to give through tax deductions on their 
donations. This fiscal incentive, normally reserved for IPCs in Singapore, is applied 
to donations to the ComChest even though not all of its member charities have been 
granted an IPC status (Chua and Wong 2003: 434).  
 
Donor incentive schemes is another tool for governments to drive preferential 
financial support towards particular charities and social needs that they deem as 
having political importance (O'Halloran 2011: 3). In Singapore, government-
appointed administrators are responsible for granting IPC statuses to charitable 
organisations, which might not always be set-up as charities. In doing so, the 
Singapore government incentivises both the public and the private sector to donate 
money to select areas of need that it prioritises (Leow 2012: 50).  
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The government’s considerable loss of tax revenue means it takes a definite stake in 
the government-charity relationship by determining, defining and influencing the 
construct of charities, their governance and their activities O'Halloran (2011: 16). 
The structured supervision of non-profit organisations through the Commissioner of 
Charities and the Charity Council (O'Halloran 2011: 161-162) also relates to the 
Singapore government’s concern that charitable activities might foster dissent 
(O'Halloran 2011: 155). This fear, alluded to in an earlier section, had a historical 
basis and resulted in the government regulating the social service sector after it was 
used to gain political power and to advocate for social causes (Maisharah 2008: 18).  
 
The Singapore government is not averse to making regulatory changes when it 
benefits from external participation and investment in its social service sector. For 
instance, to urge the private sector to give, the government offered corporations up to 
200% tax-exemption for their donations. To improve corporate confidence in the 
charitable landscape, it made changes to the Charities Act in 1995 to tighten 
regulations governing the administration and fundraising activities of charities 
(Prakash and Tan 2015: 41). It has also been guiding private sector resources to 
strengthen its social service sector. In 2015, it made headway in developing a 
Singapore Roadmap for Corporate Giving to promote skills-based volunteerism to 
charitable organisations (Wong 2015a). The Business and IPC Partnership Scheme, 
launched in 2016, further incentivizes the private sector to build the capacity of the 
social service sector. Under this scheme, the government will provide 250% tax 
deduction for the wages and related expenses of employees who volunteered and/or 
provided services, including secondments, to IPCs in Singapore (IRAS 2016).  
 
Despite its tractability, the regulatory framework has concrete boundaries. The 
Singapore government’s intent of using the tripartite governing model to address 
social and community issues is meant “to develop civil society and defuse social 
conflict” (cited in Prakash and Tan 2015: 29). To that end, it narrowed the 
permissible scope of charitable activities through its legal definition of ‘charitable 
purposes.’ It recognises four categories of charitable purposes – relief of poverty, 
advancement of education, advancement of religion and other purposes beneficial to 
the community. Even though there is no explicit legal definition for the charitable 
activities permissible under ‘other purposes beneficial to the community,’ a working 
definition has been applied by regulatory bodies since 2005 (Leow 2012: 42, 46).  
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Notably, Singapore’s legal definition of ‘charitable purposes’, which bears 
remarkable similarities to the English Charities Act 2011, omitted the “advancement 
of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or the promotion of religious or 
racial harmony or equality and diversity” (Leow 2012: 44-45). This omission is 
salient for two reasons. Firstly, the Singapore government’s implementation of 
‘Asian Values’ rationalises its adoption of the Asian model of development, which 
prioritises social discipline, state authority and state control over the development of 
democratic institutions. Human rights, defined as a Western democratic value, is thus 
portrayed by authoritarian governments like Singapore as “needlessly complicating 
the task of economic development” (De Bary 1998: 3-4).  
 
Secondly, by not allowing charities and IPCs to promote religious and racial 
harmony, equality and diversity within the country, the Singapore government has 
firm control over the depoliticization of ethnicity, which is crucial to its founding 
myths of multiracialism and meritocracy. In addition, leaving the discourse of 
multiracialism, along with its accompanying values of multiculturalism, 
multilingualism and multireligiousity – termed collectively as the 4Ms – in the 
government’s jurisdiction puts it in charge of social integration (Lee 2010: 4). In the 
government’s view, having control over the development of the 4Ms counters the 
risks of ethnic polarisation. It also enables the government to build interstate 
relations with Malaysia and Indonesia, which have predominantly Muslim 
populations, without the fear of ethnic divisions (Hill and Lian 2003b: 32-33). 
 
Envisioning a ‘Self-Reliant’ Community via Social Innovation 
 
Although acts of charity have the potential to build social capital and encourage civic 
participation in meeting social needs, monetary donations only redistribute wealth 
and do not reconstitute it (Acs and Phillips 2002: 198). From this perspective, 
benevolence requires an ‘economic dimension’ for it to be sustainable and self-
sufficient. At the same time, the Singapore government recognises the volatility of 
public donations (Prakash and Tan 2015: 41). There is a need, therefore, to 
implement a more market-oriented approach to funding social services while 
allowing civic and private sector participation to remain as the backbone of social 
service provision.  
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Singapore’s stride into social innovation began in the aftermath of the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997 when attention turned to “small-scale donors” after 
corporate donations to charitable organisations fell drastically (Prakash and Tan 
2015: 41-43). A series of corporate philanthropy initiatives by the private sector in 
the 1990s also paved the way for the development of social entrepreneurship in 
Singapore. These corporations created ‘philanthropic niches’ that were connected to 
their business interests. This form of strategic giving later became a hallmark of 
private sector involvement in social entrepreneurship. The era of social innovation 
coincided with the push and receptivity towards corporate social responsibility in the 
2000s, and the expectation that both individuals and the community have a part to 
play in the nation’s well-being (Prakash and Tan 2015: 44-46).  
 
Markedly, the focus of SEs have also shifted in recent years; education was the focus 
of most SEs (29%) in 2007 whereas in 2013, the majority (48%) are serving social 
and welfare needs (LCSI 2014: 75). Philanthropic activities in Singapore are not 
independent developments in response to social needs. On the contrary, they are part 
of the government-directed philanthropic ecosystem, where national bodies, the 
private sector and the community have assigned roles and responsibilities under the 
MHH approach to delivering social welfare (Prakash and Tan 2015: 50). The 
government’s ideological stance of self-reliance explains its embrace of social 
entrepreneurship, not least because it extended greater responsibilities to individuals 
and their community. The internalised value of meritocracy has led the majority of 
Singaporeans to “perceive state welfare as a burden on the economy, a social and 
economic ‘infection’ that has to be avoided for the sake of economic success” 
(Walker and Wong 2013: 99). The ideology of self-reliance, thus, became a 
springboard for the development of social entrepreneurship. 
 
Similar to how the National Council of Social Services oversees the voluntary 
welfare organisations, the recently established Singapore Centre for Social Enterprise 
aims to do the same for SEs. Considering the government’s application of the 
tripartite model into the social sector, which parallels the MHH approach in 
providing social assistance, it can be determined that cultivating social innovation 
further delegates the social and financial responsibility of addressing social needs to 
individuals and their community (Low 2011; Tan 2015a). In this case, social 
entrepreneurship increases the ‘economic productivity’ of charitable actions. because 
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it forms transactional relationships with charitable givers and results in purchases. At 
the same time, the beneficiaries of SEs in Singapore are ‘taught’ to be self-reliant, 
and this decreases the likelihood of them requiring governmental assistance. To 
illustrate, about half of the SEs in Singapore operates under the Work Integration 
model, which offers the needy and disadvantaged skills training and employment 
opportunities (MSF 2012: 5-6).  
 
Incorporated as legal entities, SEs in Singapore are subjected to various standards of 
compliance. However, unlike the US and the UK, there is no legal definition of 
‘social enterprises’ in Singapore (Prakash and Tan 2014: 19). SEs in Singapore can 
either adopt a for-profit or non-profit legal structure, and there is flexibility for them 
to assume a structure that best serves their operational needs and social goals (see 
Yuen et al. 2013: 10-18). In contrast, SEs in the US and the UK are governed 
through state legislatures and creating public value is an explicit requirement 
(Blodge, Melconian, and Peterson 2016: 306-307). For instance, the Community 
Interest Company in the UK is a specialised corporate structure that requires SEs to 
commit their assets and revenues for public good. Similarly, the US has the Benefit 
Corporation structure with legally defined goals for SEs to meet (LCSI 2014: 22).  
 
In Singapore, SEs are utilised by the Ministry of Social and Family Development as 
part of the social safety net. To a certain extent, the lack of legislation surrounding 
SEs in Singapore brings multiple benefits. Firstly, it allows SEs to adapt to market 
changes and apply capitalist market mechanisms. Secondly, it lowers the barrier to 
entry to start SEs. The Singapore government is also keen to fund youth start-ups and 
develop social entrepreneurship education programmes in schools to increase civic 
participation (Low 2011; MSF 2013). In fact, the lack of explicit legal boundaries 
gives the government more clout in influencing the construct and activities of SEs. It 
exercises control over the social sector through funding criteria and regulatory 
standards (see LCSI 2014: 65). SEs are then subject to “management by 
measurement,” with the government channelling resources to areas of needs it deems 
pertinent (O'Halloran 2012: 454-455).  
 
Another reason for the Singapore government’s financial and regulatory support for 
SEs relates to the “widening social space” (Maisharah 2008: 19), which necessitated 
“a careful management of pluralism and encouragement of diverse community 
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stakeholders” (Prakash and Tan 2015: 29). Providing opportunities for individuals to 
take vested social and financial interests in community-initiated solutions, such as 
SEs, facilitates the “consolidation of civil society” (O'Halloran 2012: 91). For 
governments, increasing civic participation is “an opportunity to enhance the 
capacity of democratic politics” because individuals who are involved in meeting 
social needs are likely to be people “who cared about the local and national political 
frame of reference for social disadvantage (O'Halloran 2011: 107-108).  
 
In other words, social action and civic participation in the charitable landscape hedge 
against the risk of political activism, where the government has to assume part of the 
blame for its passivity (Livingstone 2013: 351-352). Therefore, the people’s anger 
and discontent against social problems can be productively channelled into social 
action. Increasing civic participation in addressing social needs diverts attention 
away from the government’s inaction and “the inherent structural problems of the 
capitalist system” (cited in Chong and Ng 2016: 3). One can also argue that 
charitable organisations in Singapore, playing the part of social service providers 
under the MHH approach, have limited power to effect social change. They are 
"simply follow[ing] the piper's tune" while “[t]he brains and heart of social 




Taken together, Singapore’s financial and regulatory support for charitable 
organisations and SEs stem from the convergent influences of the PAP’s tenet of 
multiracialism, meritocracy and pragmatism. In addition to reducing the 
government’s burden of social service provision, regulatory power possesses a latent 
potential to limit the impact of charitable activities. The government has also shown 
its inclination to adapt its regulatory framework to restrain/expand the scope of 
charitable initiatives in the charitable landscape by offering fiscal incentives. The 
implementation of charity law and regulations serves a strategic function for the 
government to guide how and which social needs should be met. As a result, the 
“expansion of state sovereignty” in Singapore, evidenced through the state’s 
encroachment into the charitable landscape through funding criteria and regulatory 
mechanisms, confers upon its citizens increasingly clear-cut roles and obligations 
towards their country (Hill and Lian 2003b: 33). 
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Chapter 3  – 





The National Kidney Foundation of Singapore (NKF) was founded in 1969 by 
nephrologist Khoon Oon Teik after losing his brother to kidney failure (ST 2004a). 
The registered charity ran 21 kidney dialysis centres in Singapore and reported 
having more than 2,000 patients under its care (Chua 2005b; ST 2004b). In 1995, it 
was given the status of an Institution of a Public Character (IPC) under the Income 
Tax Act, and donors received tax deductions for their giving (KPMG 2005: 28). As 
the ‘poster child’ of the local charity sector, it received widespread national support, 
including patronage from government leaders in Singapore (Wong 2005a). It had a 
stellar fundraising record and raised S$67.5 million in 2002, which was 18% of the 
total donations made in Singapore (Tan 2004c). Two-thirds of Singaporeans also 
donated to the charity (Long 2004), and its recurring monthly donation programme, 
LifeDrops, generated over $25 million annually (Chua 2005b).  
 
In this chapter, the NKF saga in 2005 will be used as a case study to detail the 
Singapore government’s use of regulatory power in the charitable landscape to deal 
with the charity crisis, which had the likelihood of turning into a political 
controversy. To show the changing terms of engagement in the charitable landscape 
between the government and the public, the developments of the NKF saga are 
presented in chronological order. Additionally, the events that triggered the ‘gold tap 
scandal’ and the government’s approach of using regulatory reform after the saga to 
limit the damage to its political reputation are correlative to the ‘light touch regime’ 
that it implemented in the charitable landscape.  
 
‘Regulatory power’ is understood here as the assertion of state power through 
regulatory mechanisms to influence the charitable actions of its citizens. As it will be 
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shown, the government’s exercise of regulatory power in Singapore is shaped by the 
public response, and changes to extant regulations are made only when forceful 
public resistance threatens its political legitimacy. As a result, the public and sectoral 
feedback the government later sought when ‘strengthening’ its regulatory framework 
had the effect of enhancing public receptiveness towards these new policies, 
essentially “forging ‘consensus politics’ between the citizenry and the government” 
(Lee 2010: 91). Thus, regulatory power can be said to have a mediating function 
between the government and the electorate. Formulating regulations requires both 
parties to come to a consensus despite having differing goals and purposes for the 
application of these regulations.  
 
The Gold Tap Scandal and Public Furore 
 
On 19th April 2004, The Straits Times published a news article alleging wastefulness 
and extravagance within NKF. The main crux of the article by journalist Susan Long 
centred on the anecdote of a retired contractor. He recounted his deep displeasure at 
having to install expensive lavatory fittings, which included a gold-plated tap, in the 
bathroom of the CEO’s office suite at NKF’s new headquarters (Long 2004). NKF 
refuted the claims made about the gold-plated tap, amongst others, and sent a 
lawyer’s letter to Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), which owns The Straits Times. 
The charity demanded a retraction and an apology (CNA 2004b). Along with NKF, 
Thambirajah Tharmadurai Durai (TT Durai), the CEO of the charity, later sued SPH 
and Long for defamation and sought damages of S$3.24 million (Tan 2015b). 
 
In the weeks preceding the incriminating article, NKF had been the subject of public 
debate over the revelation that it had reserves of S$189 million (Tan 2004c), and was 
in talks with multinational insurance company Aviva to provide referrals of potential 
clients. These referrals would be made by NKF from its island-wide health 
screenings and database of one million donors. In return, it would receive S$5 
million dollars from Aviva over the next five years (Tan 2004a). In response to the 
criticisms levelled against it, the charity provided a breakdown of how each donated 
dollar was spent to quell public disapproval. It asserted that S$0.56 out of every 
dollar it received was allocated to the 2,000 beneficiaries it supported and to 
administer its programmes, with S$0.26 placed in reserves, and S$0.15 spent on 
fundraising expenses (ST 2004b).  
 38 
The NKF had previously reported different figures in its 2004 Investment Report 
(KPMG 2005: 152). When the discrepancy was brought to public attention, it quickly 
clarified that those figures were erroneous (ST 2004b). The charity also mentioned 
that its tax-exempt status meant it had fulfilled the legal requirement of spending 
“80% of its income on its beneficiaries and programmes” (Tan 2004c). Government 
ministers also came out in support of the beleaguered charity (CNA 2004a). Then-
Acting Health Minister Khaw Boon Wan (Khaw) noted that the Commissioner of 
Charities (CoC) and the Ministry of Finance “would have reacted many years ago” if 
rules or regulations had been disregarded (cited in CNA 2004a). Importantly, this 
deference to regulations as the mode of ‘government’ would eventually become a 
point of public contention as the NKF saga unfolded. 
 
A year later, on 11 July 2005, the defamation lawsuit against SPH and Long 
commenced and was scheduled to go on for ten days (Lim 2005). However, the case 
was withdrawn after two days when TT Durai admitted in court that the gold-plated 
tap was indeed installed, but was later removed and replaced with a cheaper, chrome-
plated version (Wong and Low 2005). In addition, it was disclosed that the charity 
had inflated its patient numbers (Berger 2005), TT Durai was paid a monthly salary 
of S$25,000, and that he was awarded almost S$1.8 million in bonuses between 2002 
and 2004 (CNA 2005e). Significantly, he confessed that he flew first-class using the 
charity’s funds (Berger 2005) – a statement he disputed in the two libel cases he won 
in the 1990s and an allegation firmly denied by then-NKF chairman Richard Yong 
when he was interviewed by Long in 2004 (Loh and Lum 2005; Long 2004).  
 
The court proceedings were made front page stories in every newspaper in Singapore 
(Wee and Chong 2009: 14), and the anger of Singaporeans was palpable. More than 
6,800 LifeDrops donors withdrew from the monthly donation programme two days 
after the close of the legal proceedings (Henson 2005), and more than 50,000 
LifeDrops donors eventually dropped out after the independent audit by accounting 
firm KPMG was published in December 2005 (CNA 2005d). TT Durai, who had 
been involved with the charity for 37 years, including 13 years as its CEO, remarked 
that he had done nothing wrong and did not intend to resign (Wong 2005b). 
However, the topic of his extravagant salary and bonuses dominated Internet forums 
and an online petition calling for his resignation garnered more than 40,000 
signatures in two days (Berger 2005). A few hundred members of the public also 
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called or wrote to The Straits Times, conveying their outrage (Chang 2005). Vandals 
spray also painted the word ‘liar’ at the NKF’s headquarters (Chua 2005a).  
 
What inflamed the situation even more was when Mrs Goh, the wife of then-Senior 
Minister Goh Chok Tong, defended TT Durai’s high salary: “For a person who runs 
a million-dollar charitable organisation, S$600,000 is peanuts as [NKF] has a few 
hundred millions in reserves” (cited in Burton 2005). She maintained she had 
“complete trust in the NKF and Mr Durai,” and would continue to stay on as the 
patron of the charity (ST 2005a). The crisis was further fuelled by reports of her 
“peanuts” comment – it spawned a meme of a Peanut Series of dollar bills which 
stated that “the average Singaporean will need about 2 lifetimes to save [for] a 
Peanut” (2005). Her comment was also seen to highlight the widening income gap 
and asymmetrical power relations between the ruling elite and everyday citizens (De 
Clercq 2006). 
 
Regulating the Regulator  
 
In the wake of the NKF saga, a corporate lawyer commenting on the public’s 
reaction said that it was “an expression of collective anger” and “an exercise in civil 
society notable for its broad range of participants” (Siew 2005). Addressing the 
vandalism at NKF’s headquarters (Chua 2005a), Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
attempted to allay the public’s unprecedented display of anger by appealing to 
reason, saying: "Unhappiness is understandable but take it calmly. We are already 
acting to fix it, so spray-painting the premises is not going to make things better" 
(cited in Berger 2005). Then-Minister for Community Development, Youth and 
Sports Vivan Balakrishnan also expressed that the board of NKF must “do the right 
thing” and win back public trust by initiating the required changes to the organisation 
(cited in Azhar 2005). He also noted that the government cannot compel the 
decisions of NKF, but it will “watch very closely” and “nudge people in the right 
direction” (cited in Chua and Lee 2005). It became clear by this time that TT Durai’s 
position was untenable.  
 
In a dramatic turn of events, Khaw announced the resignations of TT Durai and the 
entire board of directors in a televised press conference on 14 July 2005, two days 
after the lawsuit was withdrawn (Wee and Buche 2009: 11). Despite Khaw’s 
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acknowledgement that the government had “no legal right to ‘to intervene in a 
private charity’” (cited in Chua and Lee 2005), the Ministry of Health (MOH) 
released a press statement on the same day to explain its minister’s involvement in 
the NKF saga: 
On restoring public confidence, the NKF Board and the CEO sought the 
Minister's intervention and offered to resign in order to give him a free hand 
in this. In particular, they requested Minister's assistance to reconstitute a new 
Board and appoint a new CEO. NKF is an independent non-Governmental 
Voluntary Welfare Organisation. However, in the interest of the dialysis 
patients and the NKF, the Minister agreed to help in this effort… Pending 
completion of these reviews, NKF will suspend active fund-raising activities. 
(MOH 2005b) 
 
News of the board’s en masse resignation was followed soon after by news of Mrs 
Goh stepping down as the NKF patron (Berger 2005). There were also two days of 
Parliamentary debate where Members of Parliament brought forward their 
constituents’ concerns and questions (Siew 2005). Following the press conference, 
Gerard Ee, President of the National Council of Social Service (NCSS), was 
appointed the interim chairman and acting CEO of NKF (CNA 2005b). Six days 
later, the names of a new eight-member board were announced in Parliament (Wee 
and Chong 2009: 16). It was evident that the government had been working 
feverishly in the background to contain what was shaping up to be a full-blown 
corruption scandal and a government crisis.  
 
The NKF saga was a landmark development in Singapore’s charitable landscape 
because it was the first time a charitable organisation had been found to 
misappropriate public funds. With Singapore’s reputation as one of the least corrupt 
countries in the world and the government’s strong anti-corruption stance, the saga 
incited questions about the integrity of the government’s regulations on charities and 
dented public confidence in the charity sector, which was worth more than S$400 
million in 2006 (Lee, Lee, and Pang 2009: 2). The PAP stands the risk of tarnishing 
its “gleaming example of moral political rectitude” (cited in Lee, Lee, and Pang 
2009: 12), which extends to its reputation for being corruption-free and is the reason 
most Singaporeans trust the government (Mellish 2006).  
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One of the first tasks undertaken by the new board was to commission accounting 
firm KPMG to undertake an independent audit of NKF’s past practices (Wee and 
Chong 2009: 15). The 442-page report, released on 19 December 2005, uncovered 
both financial irregularities and lapses in governance and accountability, such as the 
communication of misleading claims relating to its patient numbers, patient subsidies 
and treatment costs (KPMG 2005: 158-161). One of the most damning revelations 
from the report was how little each donated dollar went to helping its patients offset 
treatment costs. Instead of the S$0.56 it asserted was put aside for its beneficiaries 
and programmes (ST 2004b), only approximately S$0.10 had been used to subsidise 
the direct treatment costs of its patients (KPMG 2005: 151-152).  
 
The release of the comprehensive KPMG report not only placed the spotlight on 
NKF, but also on the Singapore government and government agencies responsible 
for regulatory management of the charity sector. In particular, what raised public ire 
against the government’s regulation of the charitable landscape was how there had 
been multiple missed opportunities to investigate NKF. Both the MOH and NCSS 
had, on separate occasions, raised concerns about its management of funds and high 
expenditures but no meaningful remedial actions were taken (KPMG 2005: 307, 311-
312). The government’s preference for a ‘light touch’ regime when regulating the 
charity sector (Khin 2005; Tan 2004b) backfired with the occurrence of the NKF 
saga and turned it into a target for public criticism (see Au 2006; Chua 2004; Khalik 
2005a). Political commentator Seah Chiang Nee was quoted by news agency Reuters 
to have said: “There is a very deep public anger that has also gone to the 
government. The least you can accuse them of is poor judgment and also a certain 
amount of dereliction of duties” (Wong 2005a).  
 
The government’s active involvement in implementing corrective actions, which 
later resulted in additional regulations for the charitable landscape, was necessary 
because the public demanded for it to “play the arbiter’s role” (Chua 2004). In itself, 
this was a sign the public had entrusted the government with the responsibility to 
oversee the charitable landscape (Lee, Lee, and Pang 2009: 7). Any negativity 
resulting from the NKF saga will thus be redirected at the government. As such, the 
government stepped in to appoint a new board whom it had confidence in to turn the 
crisis around and delegated the responsibility of restructuring the regulations 
governing the charitable landscape to various governmental ministries (Khaw 
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2005a). The purpose of ‘tightening’ regulations was for donors to become informed 
givers – charitable organisations had to ‘win’ their trust. In fact, by using regulations 
to ‘govern’ the charitable landscape, they had the effect of turning charitable giving 
into arm’s length transactions (Cheng 2009: 231). 
 
Governing through Regulations  
 
I would argue here that the governance of NKF had failed at all three levels of non-
profit governance – corporate governance, regulation and public opinion (Cheng 
2009: 231-232). Still, the Singapore government reminded donors that it was their 
duty to exercise wisdom and conduct due diligence when donating to charities and 
IPCs (CNA 2006; Tan 2004b). As mentioned earlier, the use of regulations as the 
mode of governing the charitable landscape reflects the government’s ‘light touch’ 
regime. It believes that “regulatory rigidity” will “shrink the role of volunteers and 
civic society” (Khaw 2005b). However, as the NKF saga grew in scale and intensity 
after the collapse of the libel suits, there were concerns it would have a severe impact 
on public confidence and lead to the withdrawal of support for other charities in 
Singapore (Wee and Chong 2009: 20).  
 
In order to reduce the ‘offensiveness’ of the gold tap scandal, the government set up 
an Inter-Ministry Committee on the Regulation of Charities and Institutions of a 
Public Character (IMC) to review its regulatory practices and to consult the public 
and charity sector on the regulation of the charitable landscape (Cheng 2009: 229). 
These measures culminated in the introduction of the Charities (Amendment) Bill to 
effect the regulatory changes recommended by the IMC and the drafting of a new 
code of governance and governance evaluation checklist for charitable organisations 
(Wee and Buche 2009: 34; Wee and Chong 2009: 20-21). To better regulate charities 
and protect the public interest, the bill also endowed the CoC with the additional 
legislative power to launch investigations and take remedial actions  (Wee and Buche 
2009: 34). 
 
When examining the regulatory changes post-2006, it is evident that the public’s 
contention with NKF’s modus operandi then had a direct impact in influencing the 
new regulations. For example, to address the issue the public had about NKF’s 
massive reserves, the current regulatory framework prohibited charities with more 
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than five years of sufficient reserves from organising further fundraising activities. 
The issue of accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers being found wanting in its 
oversight of NKF’s corporate governance was also dealt with through the new 
regulations. NKF had appointed the same accounting firm as its statutory auditor for 
16 year; now, large charities with an annual income of above S10 million are 
required to appoint a minimum of 10 trustees and change auditors every five years 
(Wee and Buche 2009: 17). 
 
The regulations implemented for the charity sector were guided by three principles: 
“the approach should be driven by the community, encourage self-regulation and that 
the boards of the charities were ultimately responsible for the charities” (Wee and 
Chong 2009: 20-21). Accordingly, governance is expressed as public and individual 
responsibilities rather than state responsibility. For instance, the Charity Council was 
formed after the saga and comprised 14 representatives from the private and public 
sectors. The government intends to use their professional expertise to advise the CoC 
on regulatory issues, promote governance standards and build the governance 
capabilities of charitable organisations (Charity Council).  
 
In fact, establishing the IMC and Charity Council are techniques of bolstering and 
compensation (Lee, Lee, and Pang 2009: 9). In the case of NKF, the former 
technique highlighted regulatory reform as a positive outcome of the saga and the 
latter involved the public as quasi-regulators whose opinions guide the regulatory 
reform. Altogether, these are attempts to restore the public’s faith in the efficacy of 
self-regulatory mechanisms. In this way, governance becomes effected and 
maintained by regulations and not by the government per se.  
 
The Political Necessity of Governmental Intervention 
 
As the KPMG report revealed, the IPC status of NKF was retracted in 2001, but the 
MOH reinstated it for another three years (KPMG 2005: 314). By revoking the 
charity’s IPC status, donors would no longer receive tax deductions on their giving, 
and this would, in turn, impact its fundraising efforts. In fact, the NKF was filling an 
important gap in the health system. There were rising incidences of renal disease in 
Singapore, and outpatient chronic dialysis treatment was unavailable in public 
hospitals and government medical clinics. Over time, NKF became the largest 
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private provider of palliative dialysis treatment and was an indispensable service 
provider (Wee and Buche 2009: 3-4). In addition, the charity had benefited from 
government regulations which allowed it to carry out large-scale fundraising 
activities through state media (MOH 2005a). Thus, the NKF saga could insinuate 
that the government had failed in its governance of the charitable landscape. The 
government could be blamed for allowing NKF to continue soliciting public funds 
despite the concerns it had about its management of finances and its failure to follow 
regulatory procedures (KPMG 2005: 311-312).  
 
The NKF saga necessitated governmental intervention as the government is 
responding to “a serious threat [that] exists in the socio-political system” (Lee, Lee, 
and Pang 2009: 3). The NKF saga was politically important because the MOH was 
one of the key government ministries that regulated the charity and had renewed its 
IPC status despite NCSS’s previous concerns (Wee and Chong 2009: 15-16). There 
was a need for Khaw as the health minister to implement corrective actions if not he, 
and by extension, the government, would be deemed negligent.  
 
Compared to its previous incorporation as a society, the current structure of the NKF 
as a company limited by guarantee vested its board with greater powers (Wee and 
Chong 2009: 11). For this reason, Khaw appointed people who had “high standing in 
their professions and in the community” (Khaw 2005a). He knew most of the 
appointees personally, and they had previous experience either in government 
institutions or the public sector. The new board, thus, could mitigate the risk that the 
appointed individuals would be at odds with the government’s task of ‘cleaning up’ 
the NKF – a responsibility Khaw likened to as performing “national service” (Khaw 
2005b).  
 
In itself, the NKF saga appears to challenge “the popular perception that Singaporean 
institutions are well managed and typically reinforce the country’s reputation for a 
lack of corruption” (Lloyd-Smith 2005). As civil rights group, the Think Centre, 
pointed out: 
… over the years, through [NKF’s] fund raising activities on state television, 
it has been closely identified with the government. If fraud was uncovered at 
the NKF, Singaporeans will inevitably direct their resentment towards the 
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government, which has been seen as extremely supportive of the NKF even at 
the height of the scandal. (cited in Reuters 2005) 
When the scandal occurred, the Singapore charity sector was operating on a black 
box model – where “charities are trusted institutions with the government’s seal of 
approval” – and this explains why there was “public outcry and calls for government 
accountability” during the NKF saga. However, it is observed that “the response and 
messages from the authorities suggest that the charity environment had been 
operating, and should continue to operate, on the glass house model.” Under this 
model, self-regulation takes precedence and organisations “need to be transparent in 
a caveat emptor (buyer/donor beware) marketplace” (Cheng 2009: 235).  
 
For instance, Balakrishnan emphasised that ‘tightening’ of the regulations for the 
charity sector is “not the key focus of this [saga]” and called for the board of 
directors of charities to be more active and (CNA 2005a). In its press release and 
statements to the media, the government also shrewdly distanced itself from the 
responsibility it had to assume as the regulator of the charity sector, putting the onus 
on organisations seeking public funds to ensure they are capable of standing up to 
public scrutiny (see Khin 2005; MOH 2005b; Tan 2004b; 2005).  
 
When the KPMG report was released in December 2005, the judgment that the 
government was found lacking in its regulatory duties was detailed in the report 
(KPMG 2005: 25-26), and repeated by numerous news articles (see CNA 2005c; 
Khalik 2005a; 2005b; Lloyd-Smith 2005; ST 2005b; Wong 2005a). Before the 
KPMG report, the government could easily shift the blame to TT Durai and the 
former NKF board, but extensive news coverage of the report meant that it could no 
longer maintain its distance from the saga. Responding to the report, Khaw said the 
government “take[s] part of the blame for allowing this to drag on for longer than 
necessary” (cited in Wong 2005a). He later clarified that “[a]ccepting responsibility 
[as regulators] means we acknowledge the problems as identified by KPMG” (cited 
in Li 2006). In other words, Khaw’s initial acceptance of responsibility for his 
ministry’s failing was tokenistic; it was a strategy to appease the electorate because 
the government’s oversight in the charitable landscape had become undeniable (Lee, 
Lee, and Pang 2009: 19). 
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The government’s earnest efforts to subdue the public furore resulting from the NKF 
saga also relate to the 2006 General Elections (that was upcoming then). The prompt 
reaction by the government is hardly unexpected because as Mellish contends: 
…[the PAP’s] biggest assets are Singapore’s economy and its reputation for 
being corruption-free. This generates the implicit trust most Singaporeans 
have in their government. That’s why it acted so quickly to end talk about the 
cronyism at the National Kidney Foundation. (Mellish 2006) 
Analysts concluded that the government’s swift regulatory response in the aftermath 
of the saga was to limit the damage to its electoral outcomes and to “turn the 
situation around to show their commitment to clean governance” (Reuters 2005). 
 
To illustrate, the opposition Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) alluded that the 
PAP’s management of the NKF saga was not conducted at arm’s length. In response, 
the PAP implied that the SDP had to resort to politicising the scandal because it was 
capitalising on public sentiment to gain popular votes. The PAP maintained that the 
SDP’s arguments lacked merit because it had, in fact, played a pivotal role in 
curtailing the crisis and implementing corrective actions to the charitable landscape 
(Lee, Lee, and Pang 2009: 20). The government took the stance that NKF had been 
able to satisfy both government regulators and external auditors that its operations 
and administration of finances were above board. Therefore, the government claimed 
it was unfairly attributed with the resulting lapse in governance (Khaw 2006).  
 
The SDP had intended to use the gold tap scandal to challenge Khaw’s constituency 
in Sembawang during the Singapore general election in May 2006. It wanted to draw 
parallels between the government’s management of the scandal with the lack of 
transparency and accountability in statutory bodies and government-linked 
companies. However, its plan was foiled when 12 of its central executive members 
were served defamation suits from Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and his father, 
the late Lee Kuan Yew. The threats of defamation and libel had been employed to 
quell oppositional voices in Singapore for some time, and this was no exception. The 
SDP had essentially suggested that the government was “perpetuating a corrupt 
political system for the benefit of the political elite” (Rodan 2006). As a result of the 
defamation suits, the charity scandal was conspicuously absent from all the 
opposition parties’ election rally speeches during the bulk of the two-week campaign 
period (Mellish 2006).  
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Despite three opposition parties contesting for more than half of the total seats in 
Parliament for the first time in more than a decade (Mellish 2006), the PAP ended up 
taking 66.6% of the votes. It secured an overwhelming majority – 82 out of 84 – of 
the seats in Parliament in the 2006 General Election (Rodan 2006). For one thing, 
serving the SDP with defamation suits had halted public discussion about the 
government’s management of the NKF scandal, and with that, it could deflect 





Two complementary strategies were discerned in the Singapore government’s 
response to the NKF crisis, which was at risk of becoming a political controversy.  
Firstly, the government framed how the charity scandal was perceived by “either 
keeping its stance or framing the issue in a new way that would be more in line with 
constituents’ needs” (Lee, Lee, and Pang 2009: 10). Since the NKF saga began in 
2004, the government had taken an active interest in its development and used the 
media effectively either to drive support for NKF or to influence public opinion (see 
CNA 2004a; Khalik 2005d; Lee, Lee, and Pang 2009: 10). The sometimes 
contradictory stances taken by the government – such as the weak admission of 
responsibility by Khaw (Wong 2005a) and later, chastening NKF as more details 
emerged about the mismanagement within the charity (Khalik 2005c) – were part of 
pandering to the electorate.  
 
Secondly, to preserve its objective of a ‘light touch’ regime, the government relied 
on the involvement of the public and the charity sector to guide the changes for the 
charitable landscape. In doing so, the government balanced demands from the angry 
public with sectoral feedback on the practicality of the new regulatory changes. 
Although there was a decrease in public confidence in the charity sector after the 
NKF saga, evidenced by a S$97 million drop in total donations the following year 
(Tai 2015), the government’s subsequent implementation of regulatory reforms had a 
tangible positive impact. The success is evident in the tripling of donation amounts in 
2008. According to a survey conducted by the National Volunteer and Philanthropy 
Centre, there was also an increase in public confidence compared to two years ago 
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(Lee, Lee, and Pang 2009: 5-6). As such, even though the Singapore government and 
the charity sector did not escape from the crisis unscathed, they managed to restore 
their credibility because of these two strategies. 
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Chapter 4  – 




I don't think that we should consider the "modern state" as an entity which 
was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very 
existence, but, on the contrary, as a very sophisticated structure, in which 
individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality 
would be shaped in a new form and submitted to a set of very specific 
patterns. (Foucault 1982: 783). 
 
This chapter explains how Singapore utilises regulatory power in its charitable 
landscape to implement the ‘Many Helping Hands’ approach to addressing social 
needs. It also explains the tripartite model of social service sector governance in 
Singapore. ‘Regulatory power’ refers to the state’s assertion of power through 
regulatory mechanisms to influence the charitable actions of its citizens. The NKF 
saga detailed in the third chapter forms part of this analysis because the Singapore 
government dealt with the charity scandal primarily through regulatory evaluations 
and refinements. This chapter also unpacks the distinct position social enterprises 
(SEs) occupy as a form of social innovation that is simultaneously led and directed 
by both the state and its citizens.  
 
This chapter aims to fulfil two objectives: first, to examine how regulatory power is 
the result of the state’s rationalisation about the discourse of truth, which outlines the 
role and responsibility of its citizens in the charitable landscape; and second, to 
examine how regulatory mechanisms shape the responses of its citizens towards 
social needs, specifically the development of local SEs. In particular, the dynamic 
and intersecting relationships between the state, its citizens, the regulatory 
environment, and the social needs either prioritised or neglected by the state are the 
main attention of this chapter. It argues that the enactment of regulatory power relies 
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on self-reliance as the discourse of truth in the charitable landscape and that this 
pervasive ideology facilitated the development of local SEs in Singapore.  
 
A Conceptual Analysis of Power Relations 
 
The conceptual framework used to study the effects of regulatory power in 
Singapore’s charitable landscape is based on the five-point analysis of power 
relations proposed by French philosopher Michel Foucault (1982: 792) in his seminal 
work on “The Subject and Power.” The aim of applying Foucault’s framework for 
the analysis of power relations is not to offer a reductionist view of complex 
developments in Singapore’s charitable landscape. Rather, Foucault’s mode of 
analysis is useful when one wants to reconsider the presupposed asymmetrical 
distribution of power in the relationship between the state and its citizens.  
 
Even though each power relationship constitutes the role of ruler and subject, it does 
not mean that their roles are fixed in perpetuity. Power, then, is not the hallmark of a 
de facto ruler. In this view, power becomes ‘mobile’ because it is not the cause of 
power relationships but the result of their existence (McHoul and Grace 1993: 88). 
The specific effects of power can be elucidated by surveying how those in power 
produce ‘truths’ using instruments of power (Foucault 1980b: 93-94). In doing so, it 
provides a way to gain insights into the acquiescence and resistance of the state and 
its citizens concerning their role and responsibility in addressing social needs.  
 
The five-point analysis of power framework that Foucault (1982: 792) puts forward 
is summarised here for the purpose of providing context. Brief explanations of the 
points are also provided. To undertake an analysis of power relations, Foucault states 
that five points must be clearly established: (1) the system of differentiations, (2) the 
types of objectives, (3) the means of bringing power relations into being, (4) forms of 
institutionalisation, and (5) the degrees of rationalisation. In the following sub-
sections, these five points will be identified in the context of Singapore’s charitable 
landscape, albeit not under these headings or in the exact order. 
 
Firstly, the system of differentiations refers to elements of society, such as the law, 
traditions of status and privilege, and economic or cultural differences, that allow one 
person to act upon the actions of another. In short, these differentiations are both 
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required and enabled by power relations. Secondly, those who act upon the actions of 
others determine the types of objectives to be derived from each relationship of 
power. Thirdly, explicating the tangible nature of power begins from identifying the 
means in which power relations are brought into actuality, for example, through 
surveillance, the threat of arms or economic disparities, and other means of control. 
 
Fourthly, forms of institutionalisation relate to state, legal, societal, and cultural 
structures and systems that enable power relations to be built or maintained. For 
instance, legal systems, military institutions, charity regulations, and the state itself 
constitute forms of institutionalisation. Lastly, degrees of rationalisation refer to 
considerations by those in power about the effectiveness and appropriateness of the 
instruments of power being used to create or advance power relations, which in turn 
justify their use of these instruments of power.  
 
The ‘Truth’ of Regulatory Power  
 
The formalisation of regulatory power in Singapore’s charitable landscape occurred 
when the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) was established in 1946. In 
Singapore, charitable actions are mainly directed to address social needs that the 
government either does not prioritise or is inadequate to serve. In fact, the exercise of 
regulatory power is an artefact of state power, and I will contend that the application 
of regulatory power politicises the practices of charity and philanthropy.  
 
Before the enactment of regulatory power, charitable giving in Singapore was 
practised as ‘community philanthropy,’ where the community was primarily 
responsible for identifying and implementing solutions to address social needs. 
When the DSW was established, its role was to leverage the practices of charity and 
philanthropy to unite transient migrants into exhibiting their “Singaporean-ness” by 
responding to social needs (Prakash and Tan 2015: 16). The DSW was a means to 
achieve political objectives because addressing social needs enabled the political 
leaders to rebuild the country and gain legitimacy (Prakash and Tan 2015: 11-20).  
 
If, as Foucault says, the production of truth is the facilitation, establishment and 
outcome of a power relation (Foucault 1980a: 131-132), then power needs to subsist 
in a discourse of truth to be installed, exercised or maintained (McHoul and Grace 
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1993: 59). The discourse of truth in Singapore’s charitable landscape is a striking 
example of how its citizens’ actions and capacity to act have been subjected to 
regulatory power. When applying this Foucauldian view of truth and power into the 
context of Singapore, it can be determined that the developments of the charitable 
landscape are the result of citizens resisting and submitting to regulatory power.  
 
In Singapore, the discourse of truth in the charitable landscape revolves around the 
notion of self-reliance. This discourse of truth is embodied by the founding myths of 
multiracialism and meritocracy, which was explained in Chapter 2 as the 
construction of its nationhood to accomplish political integration. The myths of 
multiracialism and meritocracy have been pragmatically applied by the government 
in policy making (Lee 2010: 4), and in the same fashion, they shape the rules and 
conduct of the charitable landscape by instilling ‘politically correct’ behaviours.  
 
Effecting regulatory power in the charitable landscape requires a production of 
‘truth’ that rationalises the Singapore government’s management of the charitable 
landscape. At the same time, the ‘truth’ has to obscure the resulting charitable 
actions as premeditated outcomes. In this manner, resistance to the ‘truth’ of self-
reliance would revolve around their forms of expression and not the question of its 
legitimacy. The focus, therefore, shifts to how citizens can be self-reliant, wherein 
self-reliance becomes the “new mechanism of power” that capsulizes the value of 
subjects by extracting their time and labour (McHoul and Grace 1993: 63). The 
national SkillsFuture initiative in Singapore, which encourages skills development 
and lifelong learning, is aimed at promoting lifelong employability (Lee and Morris 
2016: 287). To be self-reliant is to be economically productive and broadly, to be as 
productive as one possibly can without requiring governmental assistance.  
 
Being a citizen of Singapore and/or identifying with the national identity elicits a 
particular code of behaviour that is aimed at safeguarding and strengthening its 
nationhood (Han 2016: 202). The encouragement to depend on oneself, familial 
relations and the community – in that order – before seeking state assistance is the 
rationale behind the MHH approach. This approach implicates individuals and their 
communities as social service providers whom the government then relies on as part 
of its social welfare strategy (Chan 2012; NUS 2015: 2). To that end, the government 
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has set-up social service offices to coordinate the civic provision of social services in 
major public housing estates across Singapore (Tai 2015). 
 
The government’s pervasive ideology of self-reliance relies on a survivalist 
narrative, which communicates that the hardships of the past could reprise 
themselves if citizens do not take up individual responsibility for the country’s 
success (Han 2016: 208-210). This ‘truth’ is impressed onto the citizens through 
citizenship education and the national ideology of Shared Values (Lim 2015b). The 
Business and Institutions of a Public Character Partnership Scheme exemplify the 
inclusion of the private sector as subjects of regulatory power in Singapore. When 
seen in this way, the subjection of individuals to the application of regulatory power 
is carried out not only through political and cultural citizenships but also through 
economic citizenship, where the private sector is mobilised as part of the 
government’s tripartite model of social sector governance.  
 
The Singapore government holds firmly to its belief that social service provision is a 
responsibility that pertains to every individual in the community. Saliently, when 
charitable actions are elevated as the be-all and end-all of addressing social needs, 
the structural causes of inequality are concealed. In fact, the two founding myths act 
as a form of cultural control where their internalisation governs the actions and 
behaviours of individuals (Lee 2010: 119). Of worthy mention is that most 
Singaporeans have internalised the rhetoric that self-reliance is underpinned by hard 
work and meritocratic access to opportunities. This perspective has, in turn, 
engendered their views on the attribution of poverty and the obligation of the state to 
provide welfare (Chong and Ng 2016: 14).  
  
For the Singapore government, which derives political legitimacy from the delivery 
of economic growth and development, meeting social needs and building a strong 
social service sector allows it to achieve its economic growth objectives (Hill and 
Lian 2003b: 2). Although charitable giving is a form of participation in civic life 
(Bekkers and Wiepking 2010: 4), leaving the provision of social services to 
individuals presents inherent political risks. The exertion of political influence by the 
Chinese clan associations in Singapore’s early years clearly demonstrates the risks of 
unregulated charitable behaviours. In other words, charitable donors amplify their 
influence when they mobilise people and resources towards their causes (Latour 
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1986: 31), which might not always complement the government’s objectives. To 
counter this possibility, the Singapore government uses the Community Chest and 
the granting of Institutions of a Public Character statuses offer tax offsets and to 
incentivise the public and the private sector to channel resources towards social 
needs it prioritise (Leow 2012: 50).  
 
The government’s involvement of the private sector as a social service provider 
under the MHH approach also has the intention of turning them into cultural citizens 
where they are party to the governance of the charitable landscape. At the same time, 
the irony is that providing fiscal benefits to encourage acts of charity de-
individualises its practice. Altogether, these regulatory mechanisms are the result of 
the tripartite model of social sector governance, where the government expects the 
public and the private sector to share its burden of social service provision. 
 
Forced Refinements to the Regulatory Mechanisms  
 
The effects and application of regulatory power in Singapore’s charitable landscape 
provide the context to understand the importance of the NKF saga and how the 
government sought to gain control through regulatory changes. Explaining the limits 
of state power, Foucault is clear that the state is a “codification of a whole number of 
power relations” (Foucault 1980a: 122). Power is not omnipresent because subjects 
can move beyond its reach. By this token, regulating the charitable landscape can 
consolidate civil society (O'Halloran 2012: 91). In Singapore, the use of regulatory 
power is the core means of institutionalising state power in the charitable landscape. 
The implementation of the new regulatory framework post-2006 reflects the 
government’s attempt to cope with the public furore, which had exposed its 
weaknesses in “guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible 
outcome” (Foucault 1982: 789). 
 
What was at stake in the aftermath of the NKF saga was not simply the nation-wide 
reduction of about S$100 million in donations (Tai 2015), but the public’s lack of 
trust in the government’s regulatory mechanisms. Therefore, there was a need for the 
Singapore government to move the public within reach of its regulatory power so 
that it can exert influence over their charitable actions. It can also be reasoned that 
the purposefully visible role the government had in ‘cleaning up’ the NKF saga was 
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no less a ‘governmentalizing’ of power relations (Foucault 1982: 793). In fact, the 
new regulatory framework gives the government increased control but diminished 
responsibilities within the charitable landscape (Charity Council 2011: 5). The public 
and the private sector have taken on heightened responsibilities in the charitable 
landscape. The public is expected to be informed givers by conducting due diligence, 
and the private sector is incentivised to be capacity builders for charitable 
organisations (NUS 2015: 11). 
 
By requiring charitable organisations to adhere to more stringent regulatory 
standards and public disclosure requirements so that the public can become informed 
givers, the government is applying regulatory power as an individualising and 
totalising form of power (Foucault 1982: 782-783). Through its exercise of 
regulatory power, the government has control over the development of the charitable 
landscape, the management of charitable organisations and the individuals’ 
charitable actions. Implementing tiered regulatory standards for charitable 
organisations based on their annual income, which was intended to offer operational 
flexibility and reduce the cost of compliance (Goy 2016b), actually endows the 
government with increased regulatory control over their operations.  
 
The Conundrum of Social Enterprises 
 
In Singapore, the “wealth gap challenge” is perhaps the most instrumental in shaping 
the structure and governance of its social service sector because between 12% to 
14% of Singaporean households are determined to be living in poverty (LCSI 2014: 
9). In recent years, the government has expanded the provision of social welfare to 
strengthen its social safety net because poverty and inequality had been trending 
upwards from the 1970s (Chong and Ng 2016: 1-2). Since the 1990s, Singapore has 
remained as the most unequal nation in terms of income distribution among all 
developed economies (Lee and Morris 2016: 288).  
 
According to the Gini-coefficient, which measures the distribution of income within 
a country, Singapore is perhaps one of the most inequitable societies in the world. It 
had a Gini-coefficient score of 0.43 before taxes and transfers in 2014 and 0.37 after 
accounting for taxes and transfers. The reduction of its Gini-coefficient can be 
partially attributed to the expansion of social policies such as the Workfare Income 
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Supplement scheme, which supplements the income and retirement savings of low-
wage workers (MOF 2015: 8-10). Even then, the broadening of its social policy is 
still a form of “state activism” that ‘rewards’ self-reliance (Wong 2015b). 
Nevertheless, the rising income inequality has fuelled political dissatisfaction with 
the government, resulting in a loss of popular votes from its electorate in past general 
elections (Prakash and Tan 2015: 49), especially in 2011.  
 
There are two main contradictions that must be understood before the development 
of local SEs in Singapore can be explained. Firstly, the government contends that the 
MHH approach of meeting social needs “ensure[s] that finite resources go to those 
who need help most” (Government of Singapore 2015). Yet, Singapore saw a 23% 
increase in registered charities within a decade. The ‘charity boom’ indicates an 
increase in “niche charities” catering to underserved and non-mainstream areas of 
social needs (Tai 2015). Secondly, the government has stuck zealously to the 
conviction that self-reliance must take primacy over welfare entitlements (Wong 
2015b). However, it is also the primary funder of non-profit organisations in 
Singapore (LCSI 2014: 62).  
 
The two contradictions are, really, two sides of the same coin because the 
government has always been subjugating its social policy to economic growth, 
wherein it acquires political legitimacy (Lee and Morris 2016: 286; Lim 2015a: 327). 
Even the government’s intent to reduce income inequality and promote social 
mobility, which it terms “broad-based social uplifting” (Shanmugaratnam 2015), is 
aimed at producing economically productive citizens. SEs occupy a distinct position 
in Singapore’s charitable landscape. The government’s policy narrative is such that 
economic productivity at the individual level will lead to economic growth for the 
country and importantly, provide enhanced public services and funding for social 
services (Lee and Morris 2016: 293). A thriving social sector can be used to 
stimulate economic growth, not least because there is the possibility of gaining 
external and foreign investments.  
 
The application of regulatory power in the charitable landscape has successfully 
harnessed private resources to meet societal needs. In fact, accessing the productive 
capacity of human bodies ‘incorporates’ power and is a manifestation of power 
(Foucault 1980a: 125). Moreover, the government has integrated SEs as part of the 
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country’s social safety net. The lack of legislations governing the legal structures and 
social mission of SEs in Singapore offer increased flexibility, compared to charities, 
for social entrepreneurs to develop innovative ways of meeting social needs. Even if 
the government is unable to exercise control through funding criteria and regulatory 
standards – such as if government grants were not disbursed – it is already applying 
regulatory power by effecting charitable actions to address social needs.  
 
To make it plain, relationships of power do not act directly on the subjects, only on 
their actions and capacity to act. Participating in the charitable landscape does not 
entail individuals endorsing, or even comprehending, the government’s discourse of 
self-reliance as long as their actions add to its legitimacy and do not threaten it. 
Maintaining power relations is thus a balance of two contrasting objectives for those 
in power – firstly, to ensure cultural domination by putting in place conditions and a 
discourse of truth that ensures subordination; and secondly, to minimise the risk that 




The Foucauldian view of power presented in this chapter allows the complex 
network of power relations in Singapore’s charitable landscape to be more easily 
discerned. Regulatory power is not a one-way implementation of state power 
(Foucault 1982: 788-789). Rather than see power as possessing an inherently 
oppressive function, it should be considered as a “productive network which runs 
through the social body” (Foucault 1980a: 119). The use of the five-point analysis of 
power relations conceptual framework highlights the dual participation of the state 
and its subjects in resisting and reinforcing power relations in the charitable 
landscape. Therefore, the capacity to govern results from the ability “to structure the 
possible field of action of others” (Foucault 1982: 790). In fact, the synchronous 
interactions between those in power and their subjects continually define and 





Facets of Regulatory Power in the Charitable Landscape 
 
Singapore is instructive to understanding the effects of regulatory power in the 
charitable landscape. The People’s Action Party (PAP), the country’s ruling political 
party since its independence, relies on regulatory power to galvanise civic 
participation in addressing social needs. Since wrestling the control of its charitable 
landscape from ‘community philanthropists,’ the Singapore government has 
efficiently implemented a range of regulatory mechanisms to guide the development 
of its charitable landscape and direct resources towards the social needs it prioritises. 
 
To a certain extent, integrating the practices of charity and philanthropy into society 
through the law and charity regulations are guided by the perceived social and 
economic benefits of addressing social needs. For the Singapore government, the 
social benefits of meeting social needs complement and further its economic 
objectives. The government’s paradigm is such that unmet social needs hinder the 
economic growth of the country and threatens its political legitimacy. The functions 
and problems of charity and philanthropy, thus, arise from governments and 
individuals articulating their interpretations of the causes and/or consequences of 
social problems. The subsequent commercialisation of the charitable landscape, such 
as marketized philanthropy and celebrity philanthropy, is simply a contemporary, 
neoliberal adaptation of the practice of philanthropy to address social need.  
 
Primarily, the use of fiscal incentives has been effective in encouraging charitable 
donations in Singapore, evident in the S$800 million that the public and private 
sector donated during the 28-month Care & Share Movement. Encouraging the 
growth of local social enterprises (SEs), however, reduces the need for tax offsets. 
By that token, SEs relieve the financial commitment of the government and instead, 
take on both the social and financial responsibilities of addressing social needs. The 
shift in focus of local SEs – moving from the area of education to meeting social and 
welfare needs – demonstrates the expansion of the government’s regulatory power. 
Even if SEs are ‘independent’ of the government’s influence through funding 
 59 
criteria, they are still regulated through the cultural control it exerts over the 
charitable landscape to effect charitable behaviours.  
 
Cultural control over the charitable landscape in Singapore is premised on the PAP’s 
ideology of self-reliance as the discourse of ‘truth,’ which is propagated by the two 
founding myths of multiracialism and meritocracy. The government has 
pragmatically applied this ideology of self-reliance through the Many Helping Hands 
approach and the tripartite model of social sector governance, where individuals and 
the private sector take on heightened responsibilities as social service providers. To 
be subjected to cultural control does not mean that individuals have to subscribe to 
the ideology of self-reliance. Rather, cultural control governs the actions and 
behaviours of individuals. Regulatory power is also a form of cultural control 
because the individuals’ actions and capacity to act are governed by the state.  
 
It is possible for governments and individuals to imbue their aims of charity and 
philanthropy into the charitable landscape without having a consensus of the role of 
such practices in society. In the case of the National Kidney Foundation saga, the 
public and the government had differing aims and purposes for the regulatory 
framework. In other words, the ‘ineffectiveness’ of the regulatory framework only 
comes to the fore of the public debate and deliberation when governments and/or 
individuals are inhibited from carrying out their aims and purposes through the 
practices of charity and philanthropy.  
 
When seen this way, charity regulations mediate the dissonance between the 
government and its citizens. The tension and schism arising from the dissimilarity of 
their aims and purposes have the effect of shaping the evolution of and developments 
within the charitable landscape. In fact, gathering public feedback to guide proposed 
changes to the regulatory framework, which the Singapore government has again 
utilised in 2016 to refine the Code of Governance for the charity sector (Goy 2016a), 
predisposes individuals to accept the exercise and application of regulatory power. 
The enactment and enforcement of regulatory power, then, is an artefact of state 
power because it facilitates state control over the charitable landscape.  
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 a 
Appendix A – 
Timeline of Key Historical and Regulatory Developments in 
Singapore’s Charitable Landscape  
 
1945 • End of War War II 
1946 • Department of Social Welfare (DSW) was set-up 
1952 • Chinese clan associations planned to construct Chinese-language Nanyang 
University 
1953 • Singapore Hokkien Association donated 523 acres of land to set-up Nantah, now 
known as Nanyang Technological University  
1954 • People’s Action Party (PAP), Singapore’s ruling political party, was formed 
1957 • Shaw Foundation was set-up by Tan Sri Runme Shaw and Sir Run Run Shaw 
1958 • Singapore Council of Social Service (SCSS) was set-up by DSW 
1959 • PAP won the national elections; Period of self-government in Singapore 
1960 • The People’s Association was formed by PAP and integrated into its network of 
parapolitical structures such Community Centres, Residents’ Committees and 
Citizens’ Consultative Committees 
1962 • First-ever coordinated exhibition and fundraiser involving voluntary welfare 
organisations 
1963 • Singapore merged with Federation of Malaya 
1965 • Singapore gained independence 
1968 • SCSS became statutory board through an Act of Parliament 
1969 • National Kidney Foundation (NKF) was set-up by Dr Khoo Oon Teik 
1980 • Lien Foundation was set-up by Lien Ying Chow 
1981 • Khoo Foundation was set-up by Khoo Teck Puat 
1982 • Mendaki, an ethnic self-help group for Malay/Muslims, was formed  
1983 • Community Chest of Singapore (ComChest) was set-up by SCSS 
• ComChest launched monthly payroll deduction, Social Help and Assistance 
Raised by Employees (SHARE) 
1985 • Broadcast of first televised charity telethon, Heartstrings Show 
1986 • Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations was formed 
1987 • 94,000 people participated in SHARE 
1988 • Introduction of national ideology, Shared Values 
• Totaliser Board (Tote Board) was formed (gambling revenues are redistributed to 
fund social and community initiatives) 
1989 • The Ethnic Integration Policy was implemented in public housing estates for inter-
racial cohesion 
1990 • 25th Anniversary Charity Fund was launched to celebrate Singapore’s 




1991 • Shared Values adopted by Parliament 
• Government formalised ethnic self-help group structure to meet community needs 
• Singapore Indian Development Association, an ethnic self-help group, was formed 
1992 • SCSS became known as National Council of Social Service (NCSS) 
• NCSS took over management of ComChest 
• Chinese Development Assistance, an ethnic self-help group, was formed with 
S$10 million grant from the government 
1994 • Eurasian Association, ethnic self-help group, was formed 
1995 • ‘Many Helping Hands’ approach became paradigm for social development 
• Charities Act was amended to improve public and private sector confidence 
1997 • Asian Financial Crisis 
• Ministry of Education launched Community Involvement Programme (students 
had to fulfil six hours of compulsory community service every year) 
1998 • Organisation of Senior Volunteers was formed to encourage senior volunteerism 
• Government offered tax deductions for charitable donations 
2000 • National Volunteer Centre (NVC) was formed  
• The Straits Times School Pocket Money Fund was launched to assist children 
from low-income families with school-related expenses 
• Ngee Ann Polytechnic gave 1,6000 staff time off to do community service 
• President’s Challenge was launched as an annual campaign to fundraise for 
beneficiaries chosen by the President’s Office 
2001 • Global dot-com crash 
• President’s Volunteerism and Philanthropy Awards was launched 
2002 • Remaking Singapore Committee was formed 
• Singtel Touching Lives Fund was launched to raise funds for charities which focus 
on children and youth with special needs 
• Government offered 200% tax deductions for charitable donations 
• Citibank pioneered social entrepreneurship with launch of Citi-YMCA Youth for 
Causes Initiative 
2003 • Social Enterprise Fund was launched by Ministry of Community Development, 
Youth and Sports 
• Association of Fundraisers was formed 
• NVC renamed as National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre (NVPC)  
• NVPC launched corporate philanthropy programme and awards  
2004 • National Tripartite Initiative on Corporate Social Responsibility was launched to 
help businesses align with the UN Global Compact’s principles of CSR 
• Susan Long published news article about NKF 
2005 • NKF trial commenced and later, withdrawn by NKF and its then-CEO TT Durai 
2006 • Commissioner of Charities (CoC) was formed  
• Charities Unit was formed  
• Charity Council was formed 
• Social Enterprise Committee was formed 
2007 • Code of Governance for charity sector released by Charity Council  
• International Organisations Programme Office was formed by Economic 
Development Board  





2009 • Notion of ‘social enterprise’ entered public discourse 
• Government offered 250% tax deductions for charitable donations 
• SG Cares, an online platform, was launched by NVPC to match volunteers with 
relevant charities 
• Social Enterprise Package was launched by DBS Bank for social enterprises in 
Singapore 
2010 • SG Gives, an online donation platform, was launched by NVPC  
• Refinements made to Code of Governance for charity sector 
2011 • Charities Accounting Standard was issued by Singapore Accounting Standards 
Council  
• Asian Venture Philanthropy Network was formed 
2012 • Three funds were launched by Tote Board to fund charitable projects 
• President’s Challenge Volunteer Drive was launched to promote volunteerism 
• President’s Challenge Social Enterprise Award was launched to recognise the 
contributions social enterprises made to the community 
2013 • Decline of S$60 million tax-deductible donations compared to 2012 
• Care & Share Movement was launched by ComChest to celebrate nation’s 
upcoming jubilee year of independence in 2015 
2014 • Eighteen Chefs, a local social enterprise employing ex-offenders, was franchised 
• Total tax-deductible donations increased by almost 30% compared to 2013 
2015 • The number of registered charities increased by 23% to 2,215 in the last decade 
• Pioneer Generation Package was launched by the government for lower-income 
citizens 
• Government offered 300% tax deductions for charitable donations to celebrate 
nation’s 50th anniversary 
• President’s Challenge Silver Volunteer Fund was launched to encourage seniors to 
volunteer their time and skills for the community 
2016 • Care & Share Movement involved 275,000 volunteers and raised S$1.3 billion for 
241 charities, including a S$500 million matching grant from the government  
• Business and Institutions of a Public Character Partnership was launched  
• Government offered 82,000 civil servants a day of volunteer leave every year  
• Public consultation in progress for further amendments to Code of Governance for 
charity sector 
 
Sources: (NCSS 2008; Prakash and Tan 2015) 
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Appendix B – 
Working Definition of “Other Purposes Beneficial to the 
Community” in Singapore 
 
Four categories of charitable purposes are recognised in Singapore – relief of poverty, 
the advancement of education, the advancement of religion and other purposes 
beneficial to the community. While the definition of “other purposes beneficial to the 
community” is not defined in the Charities Act, regulatory bodies have recognised 
and applied the following definition since 2005 (Leow 2012: 46).  
 
The charitable purposes included in “other purposes beneficial to the community” are: 
• The advancement of health; 
• The advancement of citizenship or community development; 
• The advancement of arts, heritage or science; 
• The advancement of environmental protection or improvement; 
• The relief of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-health, disability, 
financial hardship or other disadvantages; 
• The advancement of animal welfare; and 
• The advancement of sport, where the sport advances the health. 
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Appendix C – 
Four Models of Social Enterprise in Singapore 
 
Social enterprises (SEs) in Singapore can be categorised into four operating models 
(see LCSI 2014: 74-75; Prakash and Tan 2014: 14-16; Yuen et al. 2013: 8-9). Some 
SEs adopt a hybrid model, but they are still a combination of these four main models. 
 
1. Profit Plough Back Social Enterprises 
Under this operating model, the profits generated from the trading activities of 
SEs are reinvested to advance their social mission. SEs set-up by charities tend 
to plough back a higher percentage of their profits, and SEs set-up by for-
profit enterprises have lower plough back rates. 
 
2. Work Integration Social Enterprises (WISE) 
The WISE model provides training and/or employment opportunities to 
marginalised individuals in the community, including the elderly, ex-offenders 
and those with physical or intellectual disabilities.  
 
3. Subsidised Services 
These SEs charge mainstream customers a commercial rate for their services 
but allow the needy and/or disadvantaged to utilise their services at a subsided 
rate. Examples include organisations that provide health or education services. 
 
4. Social Needs  
SEs with this operating model are primarily concerned with addressing social 
needs and/or social issues, and they structure their activities around the 
provision of such services.  
  
